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Abstract
In the first chapter we explore the relationship between income inequality and the
Utilitarian ethic in a dynamic environment with endogenous preferences. Classi-
cal Utilitarians, like Bentham, believed that utilitarian principles are compatible
with egalitarian ones. Although this claim is not uncontroversial, this relation holds
for a utilitarian distribution of a given good among people, with identical concave
utilities and exogenously set preferences. This idea breaks down if the preferences
are di erent. In this paper we allow for endogenous preferences influenced by the
existence of habits. We show how the inclusion of habit formation, studied in a
dynamic environment, has egalitarian implications for a classical utilitarian distri-
bution. Based on this result we are able to argue that Bentham’s positive views
of decreasing inequality due to di erent consumption habits are consistent with his
normative views regarding distribution.
The second chapter explores the question of whether long-term income inequality
consistent with equality of opportunity (EOp) ethic. In order to provide an answer
we study the e ectiveness of intergenerational EOp policies in an environment with
two social groups and infinite generations of individuals, where the outcomes of one
generation define the circumstances of the next. Circumstances in this paper have
to do either with di erent preferences among individuals from di erent social groups
or with both resources and preferences due to these resources. We show that in the
former case EOp policies reduce inequality and also the EOp policy is the same as
the Utilitarian one. In the latter case, inequality is not reduced and its level depends
on the relative population of the two social groups.
vi
The third chapter studies an economy where privately informed hedge funds trade
a risky asset in order to exploit potential mispricings. Hedge funds are allowed to
have access to credit, by using their risky assets as collateral. We analyse the role of
the degree of heterogeneity among hedge funds’s demand for the risky asset in the
emergence of clustering of defaults. We find that fire-sales caused by margin calls is
a necessary, yet not a su cient condition for defaults to be clustered. We show that
when the degree of heterogeneity is su ciently high, poorly performing hedge funds
are able to obtain a higher than usual market share at the end of the leverage cycle,
which leads to an improvement of their performance. Consequently, their survival
time is prolonged, increasing the probability of them remaining in operation until
the downturn of the next leverage cycle. This leads to the increase of the probability
of poorly and high-performing hedge funds to default in sync at a later time, and
thus the probability of collective defaults.
vii
Chapter 1
Utilitarianism and Habits of
Opulence and Poverty
1.1 Introduction
“In a nation which prospers by agriculture, manufactures, and com-
merce, there is a continual progress towards equality. This will be the
result of di erent habits formed by opulence and poverty” [Bentham,
2001b, p.313]
According to classical utilitarianism, the end of government should be “the max-
imisation of the happiness of the whole community under consideration” [Bentham,
1993, p.5]. The utilitarian approach thus defined incorporates some powerful intu-
itions: it has the virtue of simplicity and it provides a clear cut answer to a number
of issues in the realms of personal morality as well as in social and political phi-
losophy. This probably explains why it is one of the most prominent and widely
adopted approaches in normative economics.
Yet both its philosophical foundations and some of its key implications have been
criticised1. In the context of social choice theory one fundamental feature of util-
itarianism has attracted critical attention, namely its potentially very undesirable
distributive implications. On the one hand, the utilitarian planner is definitionally
indi erent between alternative allocations given a certain level of aggregate utility.
Call this the inequality indi erence critique. On the other hand, the very maximi-
sation of total utility may require an extremely unequal allocation of both resources
1For detailed criticisms of utilitarianism as a theory of the good, see for example Smart and
Williams [1973] and the contributions in Sen and Williams [1982].
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and utility, especially if agents have di erent preferences. Call this the inequality
generation critique.
Utilitarians have rejected these criticisms, or at least significantly deflated their
relevance and have traditionally argued that their view was compatible with what
they have historically considered to be one of the fundamental characteristics of
a well ordered society, namely equality. The utilitarian response to the inequality
indi erence critique is at the formal and theoretical level. It focuses on the possibility
of refinements of the utilitarian view requiring an egalitarian distribution of a given
amount of aggregate utility. Bentham [2001b] for example, proposed that equality
along with security, subsistence and abundance should be one of the objectives of
a government. Sidgwick argued that Utilitarianism necessarily relied on a principle
of equality in order to determine the best mode of distributing utility:
“In all such cases, therefore, it becomes practically important to ask
whether any mode of distributing a given quantum of happiness is better
than any other. Now the Utilitarian formula seems to supply no answer
to this question: at least we have to supplement the principle of seeking
the greatest happiness of the whole by some principle of Just or Right
distribution of this happiness. The principle which most Utilitarians
have either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality-as given
in Bentham’s formula, “everybody to count for one, and nobody for more
than one.” And this principle seems the only one which does not need a
special justification; for, as we saw, it must be reasonable to treat any
one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason apparent
for treating him di erently.” [Sidgwick, 1907, p. 417]
The utilitarian response to the inequality generation critique involves an argument
that can be interpreted either as an empirical or as a normative claim. Given that
agents hold similar preferences, and given decreasing marginal utility (say, of in-
come) the optimal utilitarian distribution will be roughly egalitarian. The empirical
interpretation is especially prominent in classical hedonistic utilitarian approaches,
in which only the agents’ actual subjective preferences (whatever they are) matter.
As Samuelson put it “If people are all alike, or potentially all alike in the longer
runs as environmentalists like Bentham and Mill believed, total U is maximised by
an equal distribution of income (achieved by ideal lump-sum redistributions that
have no distorting substitution e ect)” [Samuelson, 1964, p. 417] In Bentham, for
example, the egalitarian implications of utilitarianism derive from what he calls the
axioms of moral and political pathology, namely those empirical generalisations that
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are “expressive of the connection between such occurrences as are continually taking
place or are liable to take place, and the pleasures and pains which are respectively
the results of them” [Parekh, 1970, p. 484].
The empirical argument seems rather unconvincing and the limits of the hedonistic
approach are well known. The literature is too vast for a comprehensive review. The
key point, however, is that taking individual preferences as given, and using them
as the foundation for social allocations, may be deeply problematic from an ethical
perspective and may lead to extremely undesirable conclusions. This is especially
true, when agents display expensive or o ensive tastes [Rawls, 1971] or when they
are a ected by cognitive dissonance and ex post adaptation, as in Sen’s celebrated
tamed housewife paradox [Sen, 1985].
In a non-hedonistic approach, instead, the argument refers to some sort of possibly
counterfactual, objective, or morally relevant, or even universal, in some relevant
sense, rankings, and so the previous problems can be avoided by possibly restricting
attention to ’laundered’ preferences, or preferences that agents would hold ideally
or upon reflection. Then, one may argue that, once one discards epiphenomenal
and morally irrelevant characteristics, agents’ true, or rational preferences are in-
deed largely similar, reflecting some sort of shared human nature. While adopting
a non-hedonistic approach, for example, in his classic defence of utilitarianism, J.J.
Smart explicitly argues that a utilitarian criterion will not lead to extreme inequal-
ities [Smart and Williams, 1973, p.34]. Similarly, in his seminal The Economics of
Control (1944), Abba Lerner provides an argument based on the impossibility of
knowing people’s preferences. Thus “If it is impossible, on any division of income,
to discover which of any two individuals has a higher marginal utility of income,
the probable value of total satisfactions is maximised by dividing income evenly”
[Lerner, 1944, p. 29, italics added]. This egalitarian implication of classical utili-
tarianism is endorsed by Samuelson [1964, p. 175] who argues that “if the crucial
equal-ignorance assumption were really acceptable to every reasonable observer,
then each and every person (subject to the postulated concave utility that renders
him a risk averter) would vote for a regime of equal-distribution of income, and this
constitutional feature would be instituted by unanimous vote.”
It is not entirely clear that this approach is entirely consistent with one of key
formal and philosophical tenets of Utilitarianism, namely the idea that individual
preferences should be taken as given and that policies should be based on individ-
ual’s actual, rather than hypothetical or counterfactual or uncertain, characteristics.
Williams notes that “it is after all a well-known boast for utilitarianism that it is
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a realistic outlook which seeks the best in the world as it is, and takes any form of
happiness into account”[Smart and Williams, 1973, p. 104] and also that “modern
utilitarianism is supposed to be a system neutral beyond the preferences that peo-
ple actually have. To legislate them out is not to pursue people’s happiness but to
remodel the world towards forms of ’happiness’ more amendable to utilitarian ways
of thought” [Smart and Williams, 1973, p. 131]. This reflects a commitment to
the respect of individual autonomy and also, indirectly, to the equal worth of peo-
ple. Yet, in principle, the ideal, non-hedonistic account can provide a reply to the
criticisms based on objectionable preferences and to some versions of the inequality
generation critique.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the egalitarian implications of a Utilitarian dis-
tribution, in a dynamic context when preferences are endogenously changing; and
more specifically depend on past consumption habits. Habit formation and habit
persistence have been studied widely from di erent viewpoints, including consump-
tion theory and international economics, but to our knowledge, it has not been
discussed in terms of its relevance to welfare economics and normative analysis.
Habits provide a dynamic perspective which is fundamental for the evaluation of
object of our analysis, the model’s preference formation implies that agents who
have been richer in the past (e.g. they come from rich families) are better “utility
machines” (both level-wise and at the margin).
The motivation for this research question is two fold. The first question that we
seek to answer is whether Bentham’s positive views about equalisation are consis-
tent with his normative approach on a just distribution. The second, has to do
with the fact that, as we briefly discussed above, di erent utilities lead in general to
inequality of utility and resources under a Utilitarian distribution, while the Utili-
tarian distribution is in general egalitarian if we consider the same utilities among
individuals. This raises the question of whether under reasonable assumptions al-
lowing for endogenous preferences, the inegalitarian implications of the Utilitarian
distribution of a one period model, will diminish or even disappear in the long run.2
We show that consumption habit formation has egalitarian e ects in a Utilitarian
distribution. These results demonstrate that if we allow for preferences to depend on
past consumption, the key critiques of Utilitarianism do not hold and also that Clas-
2The changing preferences of people has also been the focus of Marx’s (short) critique to Ben-
tham’s Utilitarianism. In a endnote of chapter 24 of the 1st volume of Capital, Marx criticised
Bentham, arguing that the latter’s approach did not take into account that people’s behaviour, and
human nature in general is dependent on historical factors.
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sical Utilitarianism is consistent with Bentham’s views on equality. We study the
distributional implications of a Utilitarian distribution in di erent contexts, both
regarding the assumptions made about the habit formation and the time horizon
of the planner’s maximisation. Regarding the time horizon of the planner, we con-
sider the following setups: (i) a single period maximisation problem, (ii) a dynamic
problem where the planner maximises in every period and (iii) the intertemporal
problem, where the planner is forward looking and maximises over time. Analysing
the problem in di erent setups allows us to start from very general assumptions
regarding the utility function and the habit formation in (i); and move towards the
mosre standard and restrictive assumptions used in the literature in (ii) and (iii).
Considering the habit formation, we study the two forms of habits used in economics
literature, namely subtractive and multiplicative.
Interestingly, we find that in even though in all cases relative inequality diminishes
this does not always happen in the same way. In general we find that if the habits
take the subtractive form, then the distribution is such that it leads to equality by
decreasing the consumption of the high habit individuals and increasing the con-
sumption of the lower habit ones. In the case where the habits take the multiplicative
form, assuming isoelastic preferences, we show that although the distribution leads
to consumption equality, this may happen in a cyclical way, where in every period
the di erence in consumption changes signs and the rich become poor and vice versa.
This e ect takes place only in discrete time when the he elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption does not take very low values. The intuition is that
when the elasticity is su ciently high, then the planner needs to (over)compensate
(relative to the next period) the individuals with low habits and thus punish the
ones with high habits. This e ect disappears when the time is continuous.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant
literature and the relation to the current paper. Section 3 introduces the assump-
tions of the model, the di erent kinds of habits’ formation and presents the results of
a one period case. Section 4 considers the dynamic environment where the planner
is myopic and section 4 considers the forward looking equivalent. Finally, section 5
concludes and suggests further research directions.
1.2 Relevant Literature
The question which is posed in this paper touches upon a number of fields rang-
ing from social choice theory and welfare economics to formal political theory and
political philosophy. In this section we provide a brief review of some of the key con-
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tributions related to Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism on one hand and preference
and habit formation on the other.
Considering the literature relating to critical approaches to Classical Utilitarianism
and their relation to Egalitarianism, probably the most famous critique comes from
Rawls [1971] who argued that a social planner should aim not to maximise the
sum of the utilities of a given population but to maximise a bundle (of what he
called) “primary” goods of the least well o  individual(s) (di erence principle).
This approach leads to a tendency of equalisation of the “primary” goods across
individuals. Sen [1980, 1985] also criticised the Classical Utilitarian distribution
from an Egalitarian perspective but argued that Rawls’ use of primary goods was
not the most appropriate for an egalitarian distribution and instead argued for the
use of what he called “capability”. The reason for this is that if the primary goods
were equally distributed, then the Rawlsian argument would be for a redistribution
of income but for Sen, income should be distributed not equally but depending on
peoples’ physical or mental capabilities, as a less (physically or mentally) "capable"
person would need more income higher income than a more "capable" person.
Myerson [1981], analyzed the relationship between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism
with respect to the “timing e ect”. The “timing e ect" refers to the fact that di erent
conclusions about a specific choice can be reached, depending on when these policies
are evaluated. Myerson shows that under reasonable conditions a social choice can
be either Utilitarian or Egalitarian and not both at the same time.
Although the present paper, at least to our knowledge, constitutes a novel contri-
bution from a normative point of view, habit formation is a topic broadly discussed
in economics research3. One of the first economists who highlighted the importance
of habits in preference formation was Irving Fisher [1930] in his magnum opus, The
Theory of Interest, where he used the notion of habits to discuss the relationship
between standards of living and impatience.
Duesenberry [1949] was the first to introduce the idea that consumption habits of
the previous period, a ect the preferences of present consumption. From a similar
point of view, Jr and Heal [1973] and Boyer [1978] formally introduced consumption
habits in the neoclassical growth model and studied the optimal growth paths.
Becker and Murphy [1988]- building on the Stigler and Becker [1977] model of the
e ects of addiction, habitual behavior, advertising, and fashions on the stability
of tastes- present a forward looking maximisation model with rational addictions
which provides explanations regarding empirical issues relating to consumption.
3See Messinis [1999].
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Habit formation has been used as a tool for explaining the empirical “puzzles” in
consumption theory and in (the consumption- based) asset pricing theory. Ferson
and Constantinides [1991], included consumption habits and provided an expla-
nation of the fact that consumption does not change su ciently as a response to
unexpected changes in income (excess smoothness). 4 Constantinides [1990] argues
that habit persistence provides a solution to the equity premium puzzle 5 and finds
empirical evidence that the consumption habit persists for a period longer than one
year. Campbell and Cochrane [1995] argue that by adding a habit in the utility
function, we can explain the pro-cyclical variation of the stock prices.
1.3 Economic Environment
Consider an economy with two individuals indexed by i = 1, 2 and a cake of size
equal to 1, where the utilitarian social planner chooses how to divide the cake
between the two individuals such that the total Utility is maximised. The utility
of each of the individuals depends not only on present consumption levels but also
on past consumption levels. This dependence on past consumption takes the form
of what is referred to as “habit” in the economic literature. We first focus in a one
period case where the the individuals have given habits and the planner chooses
their consumption levels. This simple case can provide useful intuition and some
more general results.
1.4 Single Period Problem
Let the utility function of each individual take the form
U = u(S(c, h)) (1.1)
where c is the consumption level of the individual, S(c, h) captures the relationship
between consumption and habits that enters the utility function and can be seen as
an intermediate production function.
Assumption 1: u is increasing and (quasi-) concave in S.
The assumptions regarding u and S aim to capture several psychological situations
related to habit formation, namely the notions of tolerance, reinforcement and with-
drawal. For our present framework, we are only interested in the fist notions and
4Also see Deaton Paradox [Deaton, 1992].
5The role of habits in providing an explanation for the equity premium puzzle has been discussed
by Abel [1990, 1998]
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the conditions that are imposed because of this to u and S. Becker and Murphy
[1988] define tolerance (of a harmful good) as follows:
Tolerance means that given levels of consumption are less satisfying
when past consumption has been greater... [H]armful addictions ... im-
ply a form of tolerance because higher past consumption of the harmful
good, lowers the present utility from the same consumption level. (p.
682)
The economics literature, has considered two types of cases for function S which
capture tolerance, namely subtractive and multiplicative forms of habits.6 These can
be expressed by the following:
Assumption S: S(c, h) = c≠ –h, where – œ (0, 1).
Assumption M: S(c, h) = ch“ , with “ œ (0, 1).7
It is easy to prove that for both of these cases the assumption of tolerance holds.8
Note that in both cases a marginal change in h has a relatively smaller e ect than
a marginal change in c, by the assumption that current habits have a smaller e ect
in the overall utility than the current levels of consumption, i.e. –, “ œ (0, 1). This
can be formally expressed in the general case by:
Without loss of generality let the habit of the first individual be h1 = h œ
1
1
2 , 1
2
and the habit of the second one be h2 = 1≠ h. The utilitarian social planner
max
c1,c2
{u(S(c1, h1)) + u(S(c2, h2))}, (MP 1)
such that
c1 + c2 = 1. (1.2)
Proposition 1. Given A.1, at the solution of the maximisation problem, c1 ≠ c2 <
h1 ≠ h2 for either AS or AM.
Proof. At the solution of the problem,
uS(S(c1, h1))Sc1(c1, h1) = uS(S(c2, h2))Sc2(c2, h2). (1.3)
6For more details about the di erences between the two forms see Carroll [2000], Constantinides
[1990], Abel [1990] and Gali [1994].
7Note that under both AS and under AM, u is increasing and concave with respect to consump-
tion; see Carroll [2000].
8For the assumption of reinforcement to hold, we need to make some further assumptions about
the utility function.
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Given that h1 > h2, for either AS or AM
Sc1(c1, h1) Æ Sc2(c2, h2), (1.4)
for all c1, c2 œ (0, 1), and thus
uS(S(c1, h1)) Ø uS(S(c2, h2)), (1.5)
Then from A.1, we get that
S(c1, h1) Æ S(c2, h2). (1.6)
Then given that h1 > h2, we get that (1.6) holds if and only if c1 is not su ciently
large compered to c2, such that its positive e ect on S(.) is greater than the relative
to h2 negative e ect of h1 to S(.). In this way (1.6) holds i 
c1 ≠ c2 < h1 ≠ h2.
In an one period maximisation, the habit stock h, can be seen as the consumption
of the previous period. Hence the result shows that inequality does not grow in the
same direction as past inequality. This result raises two further questions.
(i) Whether the consumption of the high habit individual is higher than the con-
sumption of the one with lower habit (c1 > c2).
(ii) If not, whether the absolute consumption inequality is lower than inequality
of habit stocks (|c1 ≠ c2| < h1 ≠ h2).
Given the generality of the functions u and S, it is not possible to answer these
questions without considering the cases AS and AM separately.
Corollary 1. Under AS, at the solution of MP 1; c1 > c2.
Proof. Assuming AS, gives
Sc1(c1, h1) = Sc2(c2, h2),
which following the steps of the proof of Proposition 1 leads to
S(c1, h1) = S(c2, h2). (1.7)
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If we substitute S, we get
c1 ≠ –h1 = c2 ≠ –h2,
or
c1 ≠ c2 = –(h1 ≠ h2) > 0. (1.8)
Under AM, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the Utilitarian distribution
under the same assumptions, thus we have to make further assumptions considering
the utility function. In the following, we consider the usual case in the literature of
isoelastic utility9:
u(S) = S
1≠R
1≠R, (1.9)
where R > 0.
Proposition 2. Under AM, for any u(S) given by (1.9): (i) c1 > c2 i  R > 1 and
(ii) for R < 1, c1 < c2; with |c1 ≠ c2| < h1 ≠ h2 in both cases.
Proof. (i) Similarly to the previous case, (1.3) becomes
A
c1
(h1)“
B≠R 1
(h1)“ =
A
c2
(h2)“
B≠R 1
(h2)“ , (1.10)
or A
c1
c2
B≠R
=
A
h1
h2
B≠“R A
h1
h2
B“
,
or A
c1
c2
BR
=
A
h1
h2
B“(R≠1)
, (1.11)
which means that given that h1 > h2, c1 > c2 i  R > 1. Note that for
c1 ≠ c2 < h1 ≠ h2, it is su cient to show that
R > “(R≠ 1),
or
R
R≠ 1 > “,
which is true as “ < 1 and RR≠1 > 1.
9See Carroll [2000].
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(ii) If R < 1, then for |c1 ≠ c2| < h1 ≠ h2 to hold, it is su cient to prove that
h1
h2
>
A
h1
h2
B“(1≠R)
, (1.12)
which is true given that h1 > h2 and “(1≠R) < 1.
Proposition 2 shows that in the single period problem the Utilitarian distribution
is egalitarian in the sense of reducing consumption inequalities. Interestingly under
AM, when R < 1 (high elasticity), the planner distributes more of the consump-
tion good to the individual with the high habit stock. In this way, the Utilitarian
distribution diminishes inequality which is in accordance with Bentham’s positive
views. On the other hand the liberal critique to Utilitarianism still holds, as indi-
viduals with high consumption habits will consume more than the individuals with
low consumption habits.
1.5 Myopic Problem
In order to be able to draw conclusions on the evolution of consumption inequality,
we need to make assumptions on how the habit stock evolves. Thus, assume that
for every period t, the habit stock of i = 1, 2 is given by
hit+1 = ﬂcit + (1≠ ﬂ)hit, (1.13)
where ﬂ œ (0, 1) captures the ‘speed of adjustment’ of the habits to previous con-
sumption relative to previous habit levels. Assume for simplicity that h10 + h20 = 1.
Then, given constraint (1.2) for all t:
h1t + h2t = 1. (1.14)
The problem of the planner is for every t to
max
ct
{u(S(ct, ht)) + u(S(1≠ ct, 1≠ ht))}, (MP 2)
subject to (1.13).
Proposition 3. Under AS, with u concave with respect to S, at the solution of MP
2, c1 = c2 = 12 is the unique equilibrium and is asymptotically stable.
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Proof. From (1.8), at the solution of MP 2, for all t:
ct =
1
2[1 + –(2ht ≠ 1)]. (1.15)
Then (1.13) becomes
ht+1 = ﬂ
1
2[1 + –(2ht ≠ 1)] + (1≠ ﬂ)ht,
or
ht+1 =
(1≠ –)ﬂ
2 + (1≠ ﬂ+ –ﬂ)ht, (1.16)
from which we get that the stationary state value ht+1 = ht = 12 . The eigenvalue
is then equal to 1 + ﬂ(–≠ 1) < 1; thus the stationary equilibrium is asymptotically
stable.
This result highlights the long run egalitarian implications of a utilitarian distribu-
tion, under AS. As it was already clear in the previous section we need to have an
explicit form for the utility function of individuals in order to be able to characterise
the solution of the problem under AM.
Proposition 4. Under AM, with u given by (1.9), at the solution of MP 2 (i) c = 12
is the only stationary solution, (ii) it is globally stable and (iii) for R < 1, for all t,
sign(c1t ≠ c2t ) ”= sign(c1t+1 ≠ c2t+1).
Proof. (i) At the stationary state equilibrium for i = 1, 2, hit = hit+1. Then from
(1.13), we get that hit = cit = c. The solution of MP 2 gives
c≠R(h≠“)1≠R = (1≠ c)≠R[(1≠ h)≠“)]1≠R. (1.17)
From which we get, that the stationary state equilibrium is c = 12 .
(ii) From Proposition 2, we know that for h1 > h2 and R > 1, c1 > c2. Also note
that from (1.13) we have that for all t and i = 1, 2, hit is an increasing function
of cit. Hence, from the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium we have that:
lim
tæŒ c
i
t =
1
2 ,
which means that the stationary equilibrium is globally stable.
Similarly, for R < 1, c1 < c2 with |c1 ≠ c2| < h1 ≠ h2. Given (1.13), we have
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that for i = 1, 2:
lim
tæŒ c
i
t =
1
2 (1.18)
(iii) This follows from the above.
It is interesting to note that even though in both cases of habit formation long
run consumption inequality tends to zero, this happens in a monotonic way only
under AS. Under AM, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption
is relatively high, consumption converges to equality in a cyclical way, where the
position of relatively rich and poor changes in every period.
1.6 Forward Looking Problem
We now consider the case where the Social planner is forward looking and maximises
the discounted sum of the two individuals’ utilities over time. The habit follows the
same adaptive process as before but in continuous time. Thus the change of habit
will be given by
h˙ = ﬂ(c≠ h) (1.19)
where h˙ denotes the time derivative of ht = h and ct = c. For simplicity, let the
habit stock of the first individual be h and of the second one 1≠ h and let h0 given
with h0 œ
1
1
2 , 1
2
. Then, the maximisation program reads:
max
c
⁄ Œ
0
e≠◊tu[S(c, h)] + u[S(1≠ c, 1≠ h)]dt, (MP 4) (1.20)
subject to (1.19) and the transversality conditions; given h0 and c, h œ (0, 1), where
◊ œ (0, 1) is the time preference. The current value Hamiltonian is
Hˆ = u[S(c, h)] + u[S(1≠ c, 1≠ h)] + µ[ﬂ(c≠ h)]. (1.21)
The necessary conditions for optimality are:
Hˆc = 0, (1.22)
µ˙ = ◊µ≠ Hˆh, (1.23)
and (1.19).
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In the following we assume that u is given by (1.9) and also that R < 1, which
guarantees that the utility is concave in the dynamic framework.
Proposition 5. At the solution of MP 4, (i) the egalitarian distribution c = h = 12
is the unique stationary state equilibrium and (ii) the equilibrium is asymptotically
stable both under AS and AM.
Proof. We consider each of the cases separately.
Under AS:
(i) Note that
Hˆc = (c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R + µﬂ,
and
Hˆh = ≠–(c≠ –h)≠R + –[1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R ≠ µﬂ.
The optimality conditions become
(c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R + µﬂ = 0 (1.24)
µ˙ = ◊µ+ –{(c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R}+ µﬂ (1.25)
and (1.19). Then from (1.24) we can get
µ = 1
ﬂ
{≠(c≠ –h)≠R + [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R} (1.26)
and also
µ˙ = ◊µ+ (–≠ 1){(c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R},
or
µ˙ = (–≠ 1≠ ◊
ﬂ
){(c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R}. (1.27)
Also from (1.24), if we take the time derivative and substitute from (1.9) and
(1.25), we get
≠R(c≠–h)≠R≠1(c˙≠–ﬂ(c≠h))≠R[1≠c≠–(1≠h)]≠R≠1(c˙≠–ﬂ(c≠h))+µ˙ﬂ = 0,
substituting from (1.27), gives
(c˙≠ –ﬂ(c≠ h)){(c≠ –h)≠R≠1 + [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R≠1} =
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= ﬂ–≠ ﬂ≠ ◊
R
{(c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R},
which simplifies to
c˙ = –ﬂ(c≠ h) + ﬂ≠ ◊ ≠ ﬂ–
R
(c≠ –h)≠R ≠ [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R
(c≠ –h)≠R≠1 + [1≠ c≠ –(1≠ h)]≠R≠1 , (1.28)
which along with (1.19), give the 2D system which describes the behaviour
of the solutions of the problem. From (1.19), we get that at the stationary
equilibrium c = h; and from (1.28) we get that at stationary equilibrium
c = h = 12 .
(ii) The Jacobian of the system at the stationary equilibrium (12 , 12) is
J =
A
0 0
ﬂ ≠ﬂ
B
.
Notice that Tr(J) = ≠ﬂ < 0. The Discriminant   is
  = (Tr(J))2 ≠ 4Det(J) = ﬂ2 > 0. (1.29)
We know from the Routh- Hurwitz theorem that the fixed point is locally
stable.
Under AM:
(i) The current value Hamiltonian reads:
Hˆ = 11≠R
C3
c
h“
41≠R
+
3 1≠ c
(1≠ h)“
41≠RD
+ µ[ﬂ(c≠ h)] (1.30)
Hˆc = ≠(1≠ c)≠R[(1≠ h)≠“)]1≠R + c≠R(h≠“)1≠R + µﬂ, (1.31)
and
Hˆh = “
C
(1≠ c)1≠R ((1≠ h)≠“)1≠R
1≠ h ≠
(ch≠“)1≠R
h
D
≠ µﬂ. (1.32)
So, from (1.22) we get that
µﬂ = (1≠ c)≠R[(1≠ h)≠“)]1≠R ≠ c≠R(h≠“)1≠R, (1.33)
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or equivalently
µ = 1
ﬂ
Ë
(1≠ c)≠R[(1≠ h)≠“)]1≠R ≠ c≠R(h≠“)1≠R
È
. (1.34)
From the above, we get
c˙ = ≠c(c≠ 1)(A≠B)  , (1.35)
where
A = (1≠ c)R(h≠ 1)h“(R≠1)(h◊ + (h+ (c+ 2h(R≠ 1)≠ 2cR)“)ﬂ),
B = hcR(1≠ h)“(R≠1)((1≠ h)◊ + (h≠ 1 + (1 + c+ 2h(R≠ 1)≠ 2cR)“)ﬂ),
and
  = hR
1
cR+1(1≠ h)1+(R≠1)“ + (1≠ c)R(c≠ 1)(h≠ 1)h“(R≠1)
2
.
Equations (1.35) and (1.19) describe the solutions of the maximisation prob-
lem.
From (1.19) we have that for ﬂ ”= 0, h˙ = 0, i  c = h. Note that for c = h ”= 0,
c˙ = 0 i  A = B. For c = h we have:
A = ≠(1≠ c)R+1c“(R≠1)+1(◊ + ﬂ≠ “ﬂ),
and
B = ≠cR+1(1≠ c)“(R≠1)+1(◊ + ﬂ≠ “ﬂ).
Thus A = B i 
(1≠ c)R+1c“(R≠1)+1 = cR+1(1≠ c)“(R≠1)+1,
or
(1≠ c)R≠“(R≠1) = cR≠“(R≠1),
which holds for c = 12
(ii) The elements of the Jacobian at the fixed point c = h = 12 , are
J11 = ◊ + ﬂ
3
“ ≠ “
R
+ 1
4
, (1.36)
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J12 =
“{◊(1≠R) + ﬂ[2≠ “ +R(“ ≠ 3)]}
R
, (1.37)
J21 = ﬂ, (1.38)
J22 = ≠ﬂ. (1.39)
The Trace, Tr(J) and the Determinant Det(J) of the Jacobian are
Tr(J) = ◊ + “ﬂ(R≠ 1)
R
, (1.40)
and
Det(J) = ﬂ[R(“ ≠ 1)≠ “](◊ + ﬂ≠ “ﬂ)
R
. (1.41)
The Discriminant   is
  = (Tr(J))2 ≠ 4Det(J) (1.42)
Note that given “ > 0, Det(J) < 0 for all values of ◊, ﬂ and R. In this case we
know that   > 0 (both eigenvalues are real numbers). Then from the Routh-
Hurwitz theorem that the fixed point is a saddle point. Thus, the planner will
place c0 on the stable manifold as this is the only possible choice given the
restrictions put by the transversality conditions.
Notice that in contrast with the results of the previous section, the distribution of
the social planner takes the same form in under both AS and AM. The key di erence
lies on the fact that even though in both the myopic and dynamic cases under AM,
the stationary solution was stable, in the former case the distribution tends to the
egalitarian one in a cyclical way. The fact that this changes in the forward looking
case is intuitive as the cyclical distribution, leads to a loss in total utility in the long
run.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated how compatible is a classical utilitarian distribu-
tion in presence of endogenous preferences influenced by habits with an egalitarian
conception of distributive justice. The inclusion of habit formation in the prefer-
ences has been introduced in two di erent ways such that habits take both the
subtractive form and the multiplicative form. The e ects of the distribution have
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been studied in three cases considering time, namely, a one period case, a myopic
case and a forward looking case. This has not only helped the intuition behind the
results in the forward looking case but also has allowed for more general results in
the one period and myopic cases respectively.
In the general case where we studied a one period problem, we were able to show
that in the solution of the maximisation problem, relative inequality is not growing
at least in the same direction as the initial inequality (Proposition 1). In order to be
able to have more concrete conclusions about the inequality dynamics, we needed
to make more assumptions about the form of habits. In the case of subtractive
form, we have shown (Corollary 1) that for every concave utility function, inequal-
ity diminishes and that the individual who consumes more, is the individual with
the high habit. In the case of multiplicative form, we assumed that the utility is
isoelastic. Here, we showed that in all cases, absolute inequality diminishes but if
the elasticity is positive, the planner distributes more of the consumption good to
the individual with the low habit stock (Proposition 2).
The results were extended in a dynamic economy, where we fist considered a myopic
Social planner and then a forward looking one. In the myopic case we found that
the distribution will lead to equality in the long run, in both cases of habit forma-
tion (Propositions 3 and 4). The di erence between the two cases is that in the
multiplicative habit form, if the elasticity is positive the stationary state solution is
a spiral node. In the forward looking case we showed that for both cases the sta-
tionary solution is the egalitarian one (Propositions 5-7). We found that although
in the continuous time problem and in the subtractive form of the discrete one,
the solution is always asymptotically stable and the consumption of the poor grows
monotonically, in the discrete case with multiplicative habits this is not always true.
In the latter case there is the possibility for the stationary state to be a spiral node
(Corollary 2).
Finally, we considered an economy where individuals live for two periods and their
utility depends positively on the consumption of both periods. This approach is
di erent from the usual ones in the economics literatures which discuss habit for-
mation but it is important from a normative perspective. In this case we consider
a Cobb Douglas utility and show that if the function is homogeneous of degree one,
then there are infinite solutions, where in the case of being homogeneous of degree
less than one, the only solution is the egalitarian one (Proposition 8). The first
result, thus shows that the Utilitarian distribution can be egalitarian but this is not
necessarily the case.
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The contribution of this paper lies on three di erent levels. On a first level the
relaxation of the exogenous preferences assumption and the introduction of habits
is both normatively relevant and provides an extension of the analytic frame of
distributive justice. On a second level, we provide a complete characterisation of
the optimal paths of the dynamic optimisation programme for di erent forms of
habits. On a third level, the results of the analysis provide a novel defence of
Classical Utilitarianism in relation to its distributional consequences.
Regarding further research relating to the present paper, we can identify three
straightforward areas for possible extensions that come out of the analysis up to
now. The first has to do with the existence of uncertainty in the distribution of the
Social planner, such that in every period a part Á of the social good is distributed
randomly. The question here is whether this has an e ect to our findings. The
second issue is for the introduction of growth, such that the Social planner, chooses
not only how to distribute the cake but also how much to invest in the next period.
Finally, future research can deal with other welfare- based theories, such as a utility-
based version of Rawls’ maximin and Equality of Opportunity [Roemer, 1998], in a
dynamic context with endogenous preference formation and possibly production.
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1.8 Appendix
In this appendix we consider the case of an economy where individuals live and
consume for two periods and we show that there are cases where the Utilitarian
distribution is not egalitarian. Each individual has one parent and one child and her
current consumption preferences depend on the consumption of the previous period.
For simplicity we assume that consumption takes place within a household and the
consumption of the parent and child within the same household is indistinguishable.
In this case we allow the family background of an individual to influence her ability
to enjoy current consumption both in levels and at the margin. All individuals have
identical preferences which can be represented by a utility function u : R2+ æ R,
twice di erentiable with uÕ1 > 0, uÕ2 > 0 and concave, where uÕi is the first partial
derivative with respect to the variable i and uÕÕjk is the second partial derivative with
respect first to j and then to k. The preferences are described by:
u(cit≠1, cit)
As in the previous cases, we consider a problem where each period the Utilitarian
social planner divides a cake of size one such that at every point in time c1t = 1≠ c2t
V (c0) = max{ct}Œt=0
Œÿ
t=0
—t [u(ct, ct+1) + u(1≠ ct, 1≠ ct+1)] (MP 5)
Proposition 6. Let u be concave and homogeneous of degree one, then at the solu-
tion of the maximisation problem: (i) ct = c0 for all t; and (ii) V (c10) =
u(1,1)
1≠—
Proof. (i) The Euler equation reads:
uÕ2(ct≠1, ct)≠ uÕ2(1≠ ct≠1, 1≠ ct) = ≠—
#
uÕ1(ct, ct+1)≠ uÕ1(1≠ ct, 1≠ ct+1)
$
(1.43)
Since u is homogeneous of degree one, ’ x, y, uÕj(x, y) = uÕj(x/y, 1), j = 1, 2.
Thus c1t+1 = c1t , satisfies the Euler Equation and Transversality Conditions for all t.
(ii) The second part of the proposition follows from part 1 of the proof, by
noting that,
V (c0) =
u(c0, c0) + u(1≠ c0, 1≠ c0)
1≠ — =
c0u(1, 1) + (1≠ c0)u(1, 1)
1≠ — (1.44)
Definition 1. Let Â: [0,1] æ [0,1] be a function such that uÕ2(c1,Â(c1)) © uÕ2(1 ≠
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c1, 1 ≠ Â(c1)) and uÕ1(c1,Â(c1)) © uÕ1(1 ≠ c1, 1 ≠ Â(c1)). Then Â is defined as an
intratemporal policy (IP).
Proposition 7. Assume that there is no IP, then: (i) c = 12 is a solution of MP 5;
but (ii) it is not stable.
Proof. (i) (1.43) and the concavity of u gives that c1t = 1≠ c1t for all t.
(ii) We linearise (1.43) around c = 12 . Using the implicit function theorem
we will get
uÕÕ21(c, c)[c1t ≠ c] + uÕÕ22(c, c)[c1t+1 ≠ c] = ≠—
Ë
uÕÕ11(c, c)[c1t+1 ≠ c] + uÕÕ12(c, c)[c1t+2 ≠ c]
È
or equivalently
(c1t+2 ≠ c) +
uÕÕ22(c, c) + —uÕÕ11(c, c)
—uÕÕ12(c, c)
(c1t+1 ≠ c) +
uÕÕ21(c, c)
—uÕÕ12(c, c)
(c1t ≠ c) = 0
By Schwarz’s theorem uÕÕ21(c, c) = uÕÕ12(c, c) and therefore it implies that the
product of the two roots of the above is equal to 1— > 1
Note that if an IP which satisfies the EE exists, then the solution of the
maximisation, reduces de facto to within- period maximisation. In the latter case,
linearising around c yields
uÕÕ22(c, c)(c1t+1 ≠ c) + uÕÕ21(c, c)(c1t ≠ c) = 0
or
c1t+1 ≠ c = ≠
uÕÕ21(c, c)
uÕÕ22(c, c)
(c1t ≠ c)
and if, as it seems plausible to assume that ≠uÕÕ21(c,c)uÕÕ22(c,c) Æ 1 then the steady state is
stable.
Example with Cobb Douglas Utility
Consider the case where the utility function takes the following form
u(cit≠1, cit) = (cit≠1)–(cit)“ (1.45)
where –, “ > 0 with –+ “ Æ 1.10
10The assumption of –+ “ Æ 1 guarantees that the utility function is concave.
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Proposition 8. Consider MP 5, with u given by (1.45), (i) if – + “ = 1, then all
values of c œ (0, 1) are stationary solutions while (ii) if –+ “ < 1, then c = 12 is the
only stationary solution.
Proof. The Euler equation becomes
“[(ct≠1)–(ct)“≠1≠(1≠ct≠1)–(1≠ct)“≠1] = ≠—–
Ë
(ct)–≠1(ct+1)“ ≠ (1≠ ct)–≠1(1≠ ct+1)“
È
(1.46)
At the stationary equilibrium, ct = ct+1 = c, thus at the stationary equilibrium the
above becomes
“[(c–c“≠1 ≠ (1≠ c)–(1≠ c)“≠1] = ≠—–
Ë
c–≠1c“ ≠ (1≠ c)–≠1(1≠ c)“
È
or
c–+“≠1 = (1≠ c)–+“≠1 (1.47)
Then if:
(i) –+ “ = 1 then (1.47) is indeterminate.
(ii) –+ “ < 1 then
c = 1≠ c ≈∆ c+ 12
This result shows that the Utilitarian distribution is not necessarily egalitarian and
thus provides an example where Bentham’s view of equality is not necessarily con-
sistent with the Utilitarian ethic.
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Chapter 2
Unequal Societies with Equality
of Opportunity
2.1 Introduction
“An inequality is allowed only if the institution that allows it works
to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged." [Rawls, 1971, p.302].
The publication of Piketty’s Capital [Piketty, 2014] and other empirical works on
the issue of rising income and wealth inequality1 has drawn the attention of both the
mainstream media and economics research. The extent of growth in inequality can
be summarised by the title of a recent Oxfam report: “Just 8 men own same wealth
as half the world” [Oxfam, 2016]. A di erent, but related part of recent empirical
work has focused on the inequality of opportunity to education and the limits that
social mobility people face due to their background.2 The aim of this paper is to use
insights from the latter literature and answer the question on whether the increasing
inequality observed in the data is fair according to the most widely accepted ethical
liberal view, namely Equality of Opportunity (EOp).
Since Rawls’ Theory of Justice [Rawls, 1971], in both the philosophy and normative
economics literature, the question of defining a just distribution has focused around
the distinction between people’s circumstances beyond one’s control and the choices
one makes. This cut was made clear by Dworkin [1981] who argued that there
are two kinds of personal characteristics: the ones which are related to a person’s
environment and for which they should not be held responsible for, like parental
1For other relevant empirical works on inequality see Piketty and Zucman [2014], Saez and
Zucman [2016] and references therein.
2For example see Chetty et al. [2016].
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background, and the ones for which the person should be held responsible for. Ac-
cording to Dworkin, this cut was between the preferences of a person, for which
they should be held responsible and their resources for which they should not be
held responsible for. Thus, if we assume that there are no di erences in talents (or
handicaps)3, for Dworkin the fair and responsibility- sensitive distribution is the one
which allocates resources equally among individuals, even if this means inequality of
welfare, which would then be due to di erence in tastes. Cohen [1989], argued that
even though the distinction between circumstances and choices is correct, Dworkin’s
cut had been misplaced, because individual preferences are also a ected by their re-
sources. Based on this, Cohen proposed that the correct responsibility- sensitive
egalitarian policy should be aiming to equalise, not resources but opportunities for
advantage4.
Fleurbaey [1995] and Bossert [1995] proved that it is not possible for a policy to
achieve both (i) full accountability for di erences in outcomes5 which stem from
di erences in preferences and (ii) full compensation for ability di erences. Because
of this issue, the economics literature has made “concessions” in at least one of (i) or
(ii), leading the responsibility- sensitive egalitarian welfare economics, to develop in
two broad directions. According to the first approach [Fleurbaey, 2008, Fleurbaey
and Maniquet, 2011], di erences in skills should be compensated for and individuals
should be held responsible for their preferences. The second approach put forward
by Roemer [1998] emphasises the fact that individuals’ circumstances, also a ect
their preferences, and thus people should be only held partially responsible for their
preferences. According to Roemer [1998], this can be overcome by dividing indi-
viduals into types according to the characteristics which are due to circumstances.
Then, within a given type, individuals would di er according to the characteristics
for which they can be held responsible for relatively to the other individuals in the
same type. Assuming that the outcomes are a ected by both types of character-
istics, then the distribution of outcomes within a type will be due decisions that
individuals could be relatively held responsible for, while the same is not true for
the distribution of outcomes across all individuals.
Roemer [1998] argues that the EOp policy should aim to equalise (in some aver-
age sense) the achievements (or outcomes) across types but not within types. This
would be achieved by dividing the individuals within a type into centiles according
3In the case of di erent individual circumstances Dworkin [1981] proposes a no envy insurance
scheme.
4Cohen’s notion of equality of opportunity for advantage is a more general case of equality of
opportunity for welfare proposed by Arneson [1989].
5Outcomes could be levels of advantage [Cohen, 1989, Roemer, 1998], welfare, payo s etc.
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to their preferences and then maximising the minimum achievement across individ-
uals in each centile, for each centile across types. Due to the complexity of this
approach Roemer proposed a “compromise” solution, according to which the EOp
policy maximises a weighted average of the minimal utilities across individuals who
have the same preferences. In this way, as Fleurbaey [2008] suggests, the first ap-
proach is a middle way between outcome egalitarianism and libertarianism while the
second approach is a middle way between outcome egalitarianism and utilitarianism.
Along similar lines Van de gaer [1993] proposed a simpler policy, which maximises
the average utility of the type for which average utility is lowest.
In order to answer the question of whether increasing inequality can be seen as fair
according to EOp, we employ a dynamic model of two social classes and infinite
generations. The relative income level of a generation defines what we will call
socioeconomic status or simply status. Status a ects both the circumstances and
preferences of the next generations, through di erent ways which can be related
to di erent issues such as financial resources for education and/ or inheritance of
parental social capital. Given that the outcomes of one generation are a ected
indirectly not only by the outcomes of the previous one, but also by the outcomes
of all the previous ones, then a just distribution would be the one that maximises
the outcome of the worst o  individuals of any point in time and if this problem has
more than one solutions, the appropriate one, would be the one which maximises
the outcomes of the second, third (and so on) worst o .
Our approach builds on Piketty [1995, 1998], Roemer [1996, 1998], Roemer and
Veneziani [2004] and Loury [1976]. More specifically: (i) the assumptions on prefer-
ences are similar to Piketty [1995], (ii) status captures the public perception of one’s
skills or how ‘smart’ they are as in Piketty [1998], (iii) status a ects the marginal
return of e ort as in Loury [1976] and (iv) the equilibrium concept is an extension of
Roemer [1996, 1998] and Roemer and Veneziani [2004]. We study the e ects of an In-
tergenerational EOp (IEOp) policy in two di erent economic environments which we
call Greenville and Blueville respectively. In both places individuals choose a costly
action, i.e. e ort, which generates welfare gains. The di erence between Greenville
and Blueville is that in the former, parental background a ects the marginal return
of the costly action and through this the incentives of individuals, while in the latter
it only a ects their incentives but not the marginal return of their e ort.
We find that in the first environment the IEOp policy leads to increasing inequality,
in the second one inequality diminishes and in the long run disappears. In this
way, we show that in the case where background can a ect not only preferences
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but also material conditions, the EOp policy is not su cient in reducing inequality.
We also show that in Blueville where inequality diminishes, the EOp policy is the
same as the Utilitarian one. In this way our results highlight the importance of the
structural characteristics of an economy and at the same time raise questions about
the long run egalitarian implications of the EOp ethic.
Even though EOp policies have intergenerational implications, there is very limited
work on this aspect. Roemer and Veneziani [2004] have considered the e ects of
EOp in an intergenerational framework and have showed that EOp for some ob-
jective condition is incompatible with human development over time. Roemer and
Ünveren [2017] have studied the long-term e ects of policies intended to equalise
opportunities among di erent social classes and have showed that private invest-
ment in education is a major barrier to equalising opportunities in the long run.
The present paper contributes and extends this literature (i) by introducing a more
general, equilibrium concept which is relevant for intergenerational policies and (ii)
by showing the IEOp policies can lead to di erent results depending on the economic
environment which these are implemented.
The present paper is related to the political theory literature, on intergenerational
justice e.g. McKerlie [1989, 2001a,b, 2012], Temkin [1992, 1993], Daniels [1988, 1993,
2008], Bidadanure [2015, 2016] and Galanis and Veneziani [2017]. With the excep-
tion of Galanis and Veneziani [2017], this literature has focused on the distribution
between individuals at di erent segments of their lives (for example young versus
old) without taking into account how the distribution in one generation may have
implications for the rest. Contrary to Galanis and Veneziani [2017], in the present
paper we do not assume di erent welfare between di erent segments of individuals’
lives but we allow for groups with di erent social backgrounds.
Our work also contributes to the literature on status and inequality. The origins
of the literature on the e ects of status are the seminal works of Rae [1834], Ve-
blen [1922] and Duesenberry [1949] who argued that the consumption patterns of
individuals are relative to the patterns of their close environment. The works of
Frank [1985], Cole et al. [1992], Robson [1992], Clark and Oswald [1996], Corneo
and Jeanne [1999], Moav and Neeman [2010], Becker et al. [2005] and Ray and Rob-
son [2012] show how aiming to appear to have high status, leads to conspicuous
consumption motives which can lead to persistent inequality. In the present paper,
status plays a di erent role than in the previous literature. Here status influences
the marginal return of e ort which can be seen as the e ect of di erences in avail-
ability of financial resources and/ or as di erence in social capital. In this way, our
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approach is closely related to the views of Coleman [1988, 1990, 1994] who have
argued that social capital is key in the acquiring human capital and also determines
the e ectiveness of the latter. Recent works on the e ects of social capital include
Glaeser et al. [2002] has studied the formation of social capital and [Chou, 2006] and
[Jennings and Sanchez-Pages, 2017] who have examineed the role on social capital
in relation to growth and conflict respectively. In this way our paper also provides a
link between the literature on social capital on one hand and on status and inequality
on the other.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the formal
EOp programme as put forward by Roemer [1996, 1998] and extends it into an
intergenerational context. Sections 3 and 4 present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Intergenerational Equality of Opportunity
In this section we define the Intergenerational EOp (IEOp) programme in a general
setup. The definition of the programme proposed in the present paper is more
general compared both to the static one of Roemer [1996, 1998] or the dynamic ones
of Roemer and Veneziani [2004] or Roemer and Ünveren [2017]. In the following
we will start by stating the EOp programme before arguing how should this be
extended in the intergenerational context.
2.2.1 Equality of Opportunity programme
Consider an environment with N individuals, each of whom has several attributes
that chracterise them. Based on these, any given society can divide the individuals
in T di erent types T = {1, 2, . . . , T} according to their circumstances; such that
a type consists of all the individuals with the same circumstances.6 Let pk be the
frequency of type k among the individuals. Individuals within the same type may
have di erent characteristics which do not constitute circumstances, for example
preferences regarding consumption over leisure time. For simplicity call this char-
acteristic e ort denoted by e. Note that more often than not, circumstances a ect
preferences and choices,7 which is also the case in the present paper.
Let uk(x, e), be the welfare (or advantage) of an individual of type k, who uses
amount x of a resource R allocated by the society and exerts e level of e ort.
Suppose that the Social Planner has a fixed amount of a resouce R to distribute
6Defining what constitutes a circumstance and what does not, is largely a political question
related to each society in consideration.
7For more on this see Cohen [1989].
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among the individuals. According to the EOp ethic, the Planner treats the members
of each type identically. Thus R is distributed, using a policy Â = (Â1,Â2, . . . ,ÂT ),
with Âi : R+ æ R+ allocation rules, for i = 1, . . . , T , such that each member of a
given type k will receive Âk.
As individuals within a type may have di erent preferences, assume that the e ort e
of the individuals within a type k œ T , under the allocation rule Âk has a distribution
measure F kÂk . Then, a policy Â is feasible if the following budget constraint is
respected
Tÿ
i=1
⁄
Âi(e)dF iÂi Æ R.
Call this set policies  .
Let ek(ﬁ,Âk) be the level of e ort exerted by an individual at the ﬁth centile of
the e ort distribution within type k facing an allocation Âk. Based on this we can
express the welfare of individuals in an indirect form depending on their type k,
centile of e ort level within a type ﬁ and policy Âk: vk(ﬁ,Âk). According to an
EOp view the desideratum is to equalise the welfare of individuals who exert the
same amount of e ort across types. In this way, individuals are not held responsible
for their circumstances but are held responsible for their choices. Suppose that, one
is only concerned with a specific centile ﬁ. Then we can express the problem as
max
Âœ 
min
kœT
vk(ﬁ,Âk).
The EOp policy would then require to do the same for every ﬁ. Given the di culty
of this problem; Roemer [1996, 1998] proposes a compromise according to which
each centile will get an equal weight. According to this the problem is expressed as
max
Âœ 
1
100
100ÿ
ﬁ=1
min
kœT
vk(ﬁ,Âk) (MP 0)
The objective above gives a weight of 1100 to every centile, and in this way provides
an aggregate programme for all ﬁ. Note that, the Utilitarian objective and the stan-
dard Rawlsian maximin, are just extreme cases of the EOp formulation above. In
this way, using an EOp framework, Utilitarianism can be thought as the objective
of a society that does not recognise any of its individuals’ characteristics as circum-
stances. On the contrary the Rawlsian maximin, means that a society considers all
the characteristics of its individuals as circumstances. Conversly, this means that
,depending on the assumptions of an economic model, the EOp objective can take
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the Utilitarian form (if for example all agents are identical) or the Rawlsian one
(if for example there is only one di erent characteristic among agents and this is
considered a circumstance).
2.2.2 Intergenerational Equality of Opportunity.
In the intergenerational context, the date of birth of an economic agent is clearly
a circumstance. Early work on intergenerational justice8 has used models with
representative agents in each generation, which means that the only di erence be-
tween agents is their date of birth. In this type of models, the policy objective is
the (Rawlsian) maximin but is consistent with the EOp ethic given that there is
only one characteristic which is di erent among individuals (date of birth) which is
considered a circumstance.
Recent work on intergenerational distributive policies [Roemer and Veneziani, 2004,
Roemer and Ünveren, 2017] has included heterogeneous agents with di erent in-
tragenerational circumstances which have intergenerational e ects. Roemer and
Veneziani [2004] have taken into account both the agents’ date of birth and within
period di erences when proposing the EOp programme, while Roemer and Ünveren
[2017] focused only on within period di erences and studied the “myopic” IEOp.
The IEOp programme presented below, extends the policy objective of Roemer and
Veneziani [2004] by taking a lexicographical priority instead of a maximin one.
Let x = {xt}Œt=1 denote the infinite sequence of elements xt. Then the solution of
the IEOp programme is a choice of a sequence Â = {Ât}Œt=1 with Ât œ  , such that:
max
Â
1
100
100ÿ
ﬁ=1
min
t, kœT
vk(ﬁ;Âkt ) (MP 1)
Let v1ú be the solution of (MP 1), then for vit ”= v1ú:
max
Â
1
100
100ÿ
ﬁ=1
min
t, kœT
vk(ﬁ;Âkt ) (MP 2)
...
Let v(I≠1)ú be the solution of (MP I-1), then for
vit ”= v1ú, v2ú, . . . , v(I≠1)ú:
max
Â
1
100
100ÿ
ﬁ=1
min
t, kœT
vk(ﬁ;Âkt ) (MP I)
8For example see Arrow [1973], Dasgupta [1974] and Solow [1974].
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for I æŒ.
The need for this generalisation lies on the fact that there exist cases where there
are more than one feasible maximin solutions and more constraints are needed. The
program above is arguably the most consistent extension to the EOp ethic.
2.3 Greenville
2.3.1 Economic Environment
The basic structure of our economic environment, both in Greenville and in Blueville,
is closely related to Piketty [1995]. We consider, an infinite, discrete time horizon,
t = 1, 2, . . . and a continuum of individuals with mass one, where each individual has
one o spring. In every period the individuals produce and consume a non storable
good by exerting e ort e. Each of the individuals belongs to a social class depending
on their income. For simplicity call the high income social class rich (r) and the
low income one, poor (p) and let – be the fraction of the population who are poor
and 1≠ – the fraction of the rich ones, with – > 1/2.
The welfare of individuals depends positively on their consumption level c and neg-
atively on the e ort e that they exert:
u(c, e) = c≠ e
2
2 , (2.1)
The consumption level of an individual i, is given by
ci = (1≠ ·)yi + · y¯, (2.2)
where · is the tax rate, chosen according to an EOp ethic, yi is the pre-tax income
of individual i and y¯ is the average before tax income of all individuals from both
classes, such that:
y¯ = –yp + (1≠ –)yr (2.3)
In the models of Roemer and Ünveren [2017] and Piketty [1995, 1998] the income
level is fixed over time but there is a possibility for individuals to change class (in-
tergenerational mobility). Here there is no possibility for intergenerational mobility
but income level is endogenous. More specifically, we assume that the marginal re-
turn to e ort is higher for rich people compared to poor ones, because even though
the e ort cost is the same for both groups, the net benefit is di erent. Formally, we
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assume that
yi(si, ei) = siei, (2.4)
where si which we will call status henceforth, captures the productivity of e ort,
which depends on a person’s social origins (or socioeconomic status). As Loury has
argued:
There are many reasons why a child’s opportunities to acquire skills
vary with the economic success of her parents. For example, the qual-
ity of schooling any child receives varies considerably across commu-
nities and tends to be higher in the suburbs than in the central city.
Where there is housing segregation based on income, and the quality of
neighborhood schools shows a positive correlation with the community’s
wealth, a child’s educational opportunities can be expected to vary di-
rectly with parental economic achievements. Further the absence of a
perfect capital market for educational loans means that the opportunity
for higher education and the quality of that education will be sensitive
to an individual’s socioeconomic background. [Loury, 1976, p. 155].
Given (2.4) the above can be captured by the following:
yit
yjt
= s
i
te
i
t
sjte
j
t
= s
i
t
sjt
= c
i
t≠1
cjt≠1
. (2.5)
The assumption between social origins and e ort productivity has several possible
justifications supported by recent empirical studies.9 For example if status captures
the positive e ects of social networks (or social capital)10, then e ort can refer for
example to hours of study during undergraduate studies. In a di erent context, si
could capture the di erence in quality of education, the length of education, or even
a combination of the two. In these cases e could refer to the choices one makes on
whether it is worth trying hard when they cannot a ord to go to a top university;
or whether they should do a post graduate degree or not.
Following the economics literature on status capturing the relative position of indi-
viduals and taking (2.5) into account we formally define status as
sit =
cit≠1
cit≠1 + c
j
t≠1
, (2.6)
9For example see Hershbein [2016] and Chetty et al. [2016].
10The role of social capital as e ectiveness of human capital has been discussed in Coleman [1988,
1990, 1994].
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with j = p, r and j ”= i, where cit≠1 is the parental after tax income of individual
i. In order to simplify the notation henceforth let spt = st and srt = 1 ≠ st. We
assume that in the first period the poor have lower status than the rich, i.e. s1 < 12
is relatively more than the population of the rich.
Optimal E ort
Consider the problem of individuals during their lifetime, where there the status
is given. Individuals choose how much e ort to exert in order to maximise their
welfare, given the tax. Hence, each of the individuals from class i = p, r
max
ei
I
ci ≠ (e
i)2
2
J
subject to (2.2) and (2.4). Thus, the optimal e ort of the poor, ep, is
ep = (1≠ ·)s, (2.7)
while for the rich it is
er = (1≠ ·)(1≠ s). (2.8)
Hence, due to di erences in productivity the rich have an incentive to exert more
e ort than the poor. (Add empirical literature and say why this is not captured
in Piketty for example) The pre-tax income of the representative individual of each
class is:
yp = (1≠ ·)s2, (2.9)
and
yr = (1≠ ·)(1≠ s)2, (2.10)
respectively. Given this, average income y¯ can be expressed as:
y¯ = (1≠ ·)[–s2 + (1≠ –)(1≠ s)2] (2.11)
In this way, given (2.2), (2.9) and (2.11) the consumption of the poor can be ex-
pressed in terms of s and · as
cp = (1≠ ·)2s2 + ·(1≠ ·)[–s2 + (1≠ –)(1≠ s)2]. (2.12)
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Similarly, given (2.2), (2.10) and (2.11) the consumption of the rich can be expressed
in terms of s and · as
cr = (1≠ ·)2(1≠ s)2 + ·(1≠ ·)[–s2 + (1≠ –)(1≠ s)2]. (2.13)
Based on the above, the individual utilities take the indirect form
vp(·) = (1≠ ·)
2(s)2
2 + · y¯, (2.14)
and
vr(·) = (1≠ ·)
2(1≠ s)2
2 + · y¯. (2.15)
From the above and given (2.6), the evolution of status can be expressed as:
st+1 =
(1≠ ·t)2s2t + ·t(1≠ ·t)[–s2t + (1≠ –)(1≠ st)2]
(1≠ ·t)2[(1≠ st)2 + s2t ] + 2·t(1≠ ·t)[–s2t + (1≠ –)(1≠ st)2]
or
st+1 =
s2t + ·t(1≠ –)(1≠ 2st)
1≠ 2st + 2s2t + ·t(1≠ 2st)(1≠ 2–)
(2.16)
IEOp equilibrium
Consider the following programmes:
Given s1,
max
·
min
t, i
vit, (MP 1)
subject to (2.6) for all t.
Let v1ú be the solution of (MP 1), then for vit ”= v1ú:
max
·
min
t, i
vit, (MP 2)
subject to the solution of (MP 1) and (2.6) for all t.
...
Let v(I≠1)ú the maximin welfare at the solution of (MP I-1), then for
vit ”= v1ú, v2ú, . . . , v(I≠1)ú:
max
·
min
t, i
vit, (MP I)
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subject to the solution of (MP 1), (MP 2), . . . (MP I-1) and (2.6) for all t, where
· = {·t}Œt=1.
Given this, the equilibrium is defined as follows.
IEOp Equilibrium: The IEOp equilibrium is a sequence space of tax rates · =
{·t}Œt=1, with ·t œ [0, 1] and e ort levels er, ep with ei = {eit}Œt=1, i = p, r which
solves (MP I), for I æŒ.
Before we analyse the properties of the EOp equilibrium, we will study two special
cases, which will help with the intuition for the general case: the one period problem
in section 3.2; and then a dynamic myopic one in section 3.3.
Given that the EOp criterion used here is welfare based, it is crucial to know whether
is is possible for the rich to be ex post worst o  than the poor.
Lemma 1. For all t, there exists no (linear) tax rate ·t œ (0, 1) such that the welfare
of the poor is higher than the welfare of the rich.
Proof. We want to show that ’ ·t œ (0, 1)
vp(·t, st) < vr(·t, st), (2.17)
or from (2.14)
s2t < (1≠ st)2,
which is always true.
2.3.2 Single Period Problem
Consider a single period problem, equivalent to (MP 1) for t = 1. Then, given
Lemma 1, the equilibrium EOp tax rate · , solves11
max
·
I
(1≠ ·)2(s)2
2 + ·(1≠ ·)[–s
2 + (1≠ –)(1≠ s)2]
J
(MP 1’)
Proposition 9. Let ·ú be the tax rate at the solution of (MP 1’), then
(i) ·ú = (1≠–)(1≠2s)s2+2(1≠–)(1≠2s) ,
(ii) ·ú is decreasing in both – and s.
11We have dropped the time subscript for simplicity.
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Proof. (i) From the first order condition, the equilibrium EOp tax rate is
·ú = (1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)
s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s) . (2.18)
(ii) The derivative with respect to – is:
· Õ– =
≠(1≠ 2s)[s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)] + 2(1≠ 2s)(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)
[s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)]2 , (2.19)
which simplifies to
· Õ– =
≠(1≠ 2s)s2
[s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)]2 < 0.
Also, the derivative with respect to s is:
· Õs =
≠2(1≠ –)[s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)]≠ [2s≠ 4(1≠ –)](1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)
[s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)]2 ,
(2.20)
or
· Õs =
≠2s(1≠ s)(1≠ –)
[s2 + 2(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s)]2 < 0.
Proposition 9, argues that ceteris paribus higher inequality in the previous genera-
tion and higher relative population of the rich both will lead to a higher tax rate.
Taxation a ects the welfare of individuals via two economic channels. On one hand
high taxation means high redistribution, while on the other, high taxation has a
negative e ect to individuals’ incentives to exert e ort. For simplicity call the first
channel redistribution channel and the second one incentive channel. The relative
strength between these two channels, depends on the population shares between the
two classes. For a given level of inequality, a high (low) proportion of poor individ-
uals means that the benefits of the redistribution channel are relatively low (high)
while the e ects through the incentive channel are relatively high (low).
2.3.3 Myopic Problem
The model shows that, total redistribution, i.e. setting · = 1 is never optimal as
this would a ect the incentives of both the rich and the poor, who would exert
no e ort. In this way, in the one period problem equality is not possible. The
35
question which follows is how relative inequality, captured by st, evolves in time.
Prior to analysing the IEOp equilibrium, consider an intermediate case where the
Social Planner chooses · = {·t}Œt=1 which solves the following:
max
·
min
i
vit, (MP M)
subject to (2.6) for all t.
As discussed in the previous section, this type of problem, call it Myopic, is a special
case of the general IEOp (forward looking) problem, as in the Myopic programme
the date of birth of an individual is not considered as a circumstance.12 Before we
present the solution of (MP M), let us define the following:
Stationary Equilibrium: A stationary equilibrium is a sequence space {·, er, ep}
which solves individuals’ maximisation problems and st = s1 for i = p, r.
Proposition 10. Consider (MP M), then the following are true:
(i) There exists a unique stationary equilibrium solution sú(–) œ (0, 12) with sú(–) =
1
2
Ë
3≠ 2–≠4(–≠ 1)2 + 1 È.
(ii) For s1 ”= sú(–), at the equilibrium solution path, st converges to sú(–).
Proof. From (2.16) and ·út from Proposition 1, at the solution of (MP M),
st+1 =
(1≠ st)2 ≠ –(1≠ 2st)
2s2t + (3≠ 2–)(1≠ 2st)
. (2.21)
This is equivalent to
st+1 ≠ st = 12
5
1≠ 2st + 2st ≠ 13 + 2st(st ≠ 3) + 2–(2st ≠ 1)
6
. (2.22)
(i) At the stationary equilibrium st+1 = st. Then form (2.22) we get st+1 = st for
s = 12 , or for st œ (0, 12), the solutions of (2.22) are the same as the solutions
of
s2 + s(2–≠ 3) + 1≠ – = 0, (2.23)
and these are
sú(–) = 12
5
3≠ 2–±
Ò
4(1≠ –)2 + 1
6
. (2.24)
12As mentioned in the previous section, this problem is the same as in Roemer and Ünveren
[2017].
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Given – œ (12 , 1),

4(1≠ –)2 + 1 > 1. Thus
1
2(3≠ 2–+
Ò
4(1≠ –)2 + 1) > 2≠ – > 1,
which is not possible given that s œ (0, 12). This means that the only possible
solution is
sú(–) = 12
5
3≠ 2–≠
Ò
4(1≠ –)2 + 1
6
. (2.25)
(ii) Let F (st) = st+1≠st. Note that F (st) < 0 for all st œ (sú(–), 12) and F (st) > 0
for st œ (0, sú(–)) which proves the secod statement of the Proposition.
This shows that it is impossible for the EOp policy to lead to equality of income
between the rich and the poor at any point in time in the future. If we consider
a special case, where status captures educational opportunities, then our result is
similar to Roemer and Ünveren [2017] where inequality is persistent when education
depends only on parental status. As mentioned earlier, in Roemer and Ünveren
[2017] the income between di erent social groups is constant, so in this way our
result di ers in the sense that we also show the degree of inequality in time. Also,
in our model the relative population shares are important for the level of long run
inequality.
Corollary 2. At the stationary equilibrium of (MP M), ˆs
ú(–)
ˆ– < 0.
The graphs below show the evolution of inequality captured by status, for di erent
values of –. The vertical axis is st+1, while the horizontal is st.
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• – = 0.9.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 2.1: sú(0.9) close to 0.09001
• – = 0.99.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 2.2: sú(0.99) close to 0.0099
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• – = 0.999.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 2.3: sú(0.999) close to 0.00099
The results demonstrate that, not only it may be fair according to a myopic EOp
ethic for inequality to grow, but also that a higher relative population of the poor
leads to higher long run inequality. As discussed earlier the population fractions of
rich and poor individuals a ect the relative importance of the redistribution channel
of taxation compared to the incentive one. A high proportion of poor means that
ceteris paribus they will contribute more to output, which in turn will increase the
importance of the incentive channel of taxation and lead to lower taxes and higher
inequality (captured by s).
2.3.4 Forward Looking Problem
As we have shown, there exists a trade o  between redistribution and e ciency,
given by the two channels through which the tax rate a ects income and welfare.
Let ·˜t(st) be the tax rate such that st+1 = st, given by
·˜t(st) =
st ≠ s2t
1≠ st ≠ a(1≠ 2st) . (2.26)
Lemma 2. Let st œ
1
sú(–), 12
2
, then ·˜t > ·út .
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Proof.
·˜t(st)≠ ·út (st) =
N(st)
D(st)
,
where
N(st) = ≠1+ 2–≠–2+5st≠ 9–st+4–2st≠ 8s2t +12–s2t ≠ 4–2s2t +5s3t ≠ 4–s3t ≠ s4t ,
and
D(st) = (1≠ –≠ st + 2–st)(2≠ 2–≠ 4st + 4–st + s2t )
Note that
1≠ –≠ st + 2–st = 1≠ –+ st(2–≠ 1) > 0,
and
2≠ 2–≠ 4st + 4–st + s2t = 2(1≠ –)≠ 4st(1≠ –) + s2t = (1≠ –)(1≠ 2st) + s2t > 0.
Thus D(st) > 0 for all st œ (0, 12) and – œ (12 , 1). Hence it is su cient to show that
N(st) > 0. N(st) can be expressed as
N(st) = (1≠ 2st)2(st ≠ 1 + –) + s
3
t (1≠ st)
1≠ – .
Let N1 = (1≠ 2st)2(st ≠ 1 + –) and N2 = s
3
t (1≠st)
1≠– . Note that N2 > 0, and
ˆN2
ˆst
= s
2
t (3≠ 4st)
1≠ – > 0,
while N1 < 0, for sú(–) < st < 1 ≠ – and N1 > 0 for 1 ≠ – < st < 12 . Hence
N(st) > 0 for 1 ≠ – < st < 12 ; so we need to prove that this is also the case for
sú(–) < st < 1≠ –. Note that
ˆN1
ˆst
= (1≠ 2st)(5≠ 6st ≠ 4–),
which means that N1 is increasing for sú(–) < st < 5≠4–6 and decreasing for 5≠4–6 <
st <
1
2 . This then means that
ˆN(st)
ˆst
> 0 for sú(–) < st < 5≠4–6 . Given that 5≠4–6 >
1 ≠ –, in order to conclude the proof, it is su cient to show that N (sú(–)) Ø 0,
which is true as N (sú(–)) = 0.
This result states that for any level of inequality lower than sú(–), there is a trade
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o  between maximising the welfare of the least well o  in a given generation; and
keeping at least the same levels of inequality (or status) for the next.
Proposition 11. Let s1 œ
Ë
sú(–), 12
2
. At the IEOp equilibrium, vp(st, ·t) is constant
over t.
Proof. We will prove this by induction.
(i) From Proposition 10, we have that at the solution of the MEOp, for any
st œ
1
sú(–), 12
2
,
vp(st) =
#
s2t + (1≠ –)(1≠ 2st)
$2
2s2t + 4(1≠ –)(1≠ 2st)
, (2.27)
which also gives ˆv
p(st)
ˆst
> 0. From (2.18), we get that ˆstˆ·t > 0. We also know
that for ·t > ·˜t, st+1 > st (and equivalently for ·t < ·˜t, st+1 < st). Thus, the
maximisation of vp1 leads to s2 < s1 and given this, the maximisation at t = 2
leads to vp2 < v
p
1 . Given
ˆvp(st)
ˆst
> 0, the maximum value of vp2 is bounded from
the value of s2, which in turn depends on ·1.
In this way, from continuity and given vp2 < v
p
1 , v
p
2 is maximised for v
p
2 = v
p
1 =
v¯, with
v¯ =
#
s22 + (1≠ –)(1≠ 2s2)
$2
2s22 + 4(1≠ –)(1≠ 2s2)
,
where s2 is given by substituting the dynamic constraint to vp2 = v
p
1 and solving
for ·1.
(ii) Suppose that for all t Æ T , vp1 = vp2 = . . . = vpT . Note that vp1 = vp2 = . . . = vpT
necessarily implies that ·i œ (·úi , ·˜i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , T ; and also that sT Æ
sT≠1 Æ . . . Æ s1. Also, from (2.26), it follows that ˆ·˜tˆst > 0.
In order to prove the Lemma, it is su cient to show that vp1 = v
p
2 = . . . = v
p
T+1.
Suppose that this is not true. This means that either (a) vp1 = v
p
2 = . . . =
vpT > v
p
T+1 or (b) v
p
1 = v
p
2 = . . . = v
p
T < v
p
T+1.
(a) Let vp1 = v
p
2 = . . . = v
p
T > v
p
T+1. Given that ·i œ (·úi , ·˜i) for i =
1, 2, . . . , T , sT Æ sT≠1 Æ . . . Æ s1 and ˆ·˜tˆst > 0, it means that there exists
a sequence {·ˆt}T1 which gives
vˆp1 = vˆ
p
2 = . . . = vˆ
p
T < v
p
1 = . . . = v
p
1 .
Hence, vp1 = v
p
2 = . . . = v
p
T > v
p
T+1, which means that this cannot be an
IEOp solution.
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(b) Let vp1 = v
p
2 = . . . = v
p
T < v
p
T+1. Note that at the IEOp solution,
vp1 = v
p
2 = . . . = v
p
T Ø vp(s1, ·˜1) and thus sT Æ s1. Then from (i) we
know that at the solution vpT = v
p
T+1.
The following result is necessary for the proof of the Theorem which follows.
Lemma 3. Let – œ
1
1
2 , 1
2
, then for any st œ
1
sú(–), 12
2
the following holds:
ˆvp(st, ·˜t)
ˆst
> 0.
Proof. For any ·t œ (0, 1),
ˆvp(st, ·t)
ˆst
= st(1≠ ·t)2 + ·t(1≠ ·t)[2–st ≠ 2(1≠ –)(1≠ st)] > 0,
if and only if st(1≠ ·t) + ·t[2–st ≠ 2(1≠ –)(1≠ st)] > 0.
This is equivalent to
·t(2≠ st ≠ 2–) < st. (2.28)
Here we can distinguish two cases: (i) 2≠ st ≠ 2– < 0; and (ii) 2≠ st ≠ 2– > 0.
(i) If 2≠ st ≠ 2– < 0, then (2.28) holds for any ·t > 0.
(ii) If 2≠ st ≠ 2– > 0, then (2.28) is equivalent to
·t <
st
2≠ st ≠ 2– .
Thus ˆv
p(st,·˜t)
ˆst
> 0 if
·˜t =
st ≠ s2t
1≠ st ≠ –(1≠ 2st) <
s
2≠ s≠ 2– ,
or
(1≠ st)2 < –,
which is means st > 1 ≠ Ô–. In order to conclude the proof is su cient to
prove that
sú(–) = 12(3≠ 2–≠
Ò
4(1≠ –)2 + 1) > 1≠Ô–,
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or
1≠ 2– >
Ò
4(1≠ –)2 + 1≠ 2Ô–. (2.29)
The left hand side of the above is clearly negative. The right hand side is
negative if
4(1≠ –)2 + 1 < 4–,
or equivantly if
5 + 4–2 ≠ 12– < 0,
which is true for any – œ (12 , 1). Thus (2.29) can be expressed as
(1≠ 2–)2 <
3Ò
4(1≠ –)2 + 1≠ 2Ô–
42
,
or after some calculations
≠4 < ≠4
Ò
–+ 4–(1≠ –)2,
which is equivalent to
4–(1≠ –)2 < 1≠ –,
or
4–(1≠ –) < 1,
which means
4–2 ≠ 4–+ 1 > 0,
which is true for any – œ
1
1
2 , 1
2
.
This Lemma is quite intuitive as it states that for any level of inequality lower than
sú(–), the level of welfare associated with keeping inequality constant, increases with
status.
Theorem 1. At the IEOp equilibrium:
1. For s1 œ (0, sú(–)), then the sequence · is the same as in the solution of the
MEOp programme.
2. For s1 œ
Ë
sú(–), 12
2
, st = s1 for all t.
Proof. 1. We know from Proposition 10, that for all st œ (0, sú(–)), for ·t = ·út ,
st+1 > st. Thus for any s1 œ (0, sú(–)), at the solution of (MP1), vp(s1, ·ú1 ).
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In the same way we can show that given s1 and the (MP1) solution, at the
solution of (MP2) vp(s2, ·ú2 ), . . . , at the solution of (MPI) for all I = 2, 3, . . ..
2. Suppose not. Then given Lemma 2, this means that there exists a ·ˆ1 =
·ˆ1(s1) œ (·út (s1), ·˜t(s1)) such that:
vp(s1, ·ˆ1) > vp(s1, ·˜1). (2.30)
From the definition of ·˜t, the above means that s2 < s1 .
Then from the above and also Proposition 11 and Lemma 3, there exists a
·ˆ2 = ·ˆ2(s2) œ (·út (s1), ·ˆt(s1)) such that:
vp(s1, ·ˆ1) = vp(s2, ·ˆ2).
Continuing the same process, it is evident that each period, both st and ·ˆt
decrease; and tend to sú(–) and ·út , respectively. Knowing that at sú(–),
·út = ·˜t, the previous statement means that
lim
stæsú(–),·ˆtæ·út
vp(st, ·ˆt) = vp(sú(–), ·út ) = vp(sú(–), ·˜t). (2.31)
But, from Lemma 3:
vp(sú(–), ·˜t) < vp(s1, ·˜1), (2.32)
for any s1 œ
Ë
sú(–), 12
2
, which contradicts the original hypothesis.
This theorem highlights the limitations of the IEOp policy. If initial inequality
is lower than a threshold level (sú(–)), then inequality will diminish but will still
will be at arguably very high levels, while if inequality is higher than the threshold
level, it will not be reduced. The mechanism which drives this result is the relative
strength of the incentive channel compared to the redistribution one. This di erence
in strength between the two channels, lies on the fact that in Greenville, it is allowed
for people to have di erential education.
In this section we have shown that the EOp ethic in an intergenerational context
does not necessarily reduce inequality. If the date of birth of individuals is not seen
as a circumstance (myopic programme), very high inequality can be considered as
fair if examined through the lens of EOp ethic. If we take into account that the
outcomes of one generation define the circumstances of the next, we have shown
then even though inequality is not reduced in most cases, it is unfair to grow. These
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di erent results highlight the usefulness of the introduction of the IEOp ethical
criterion.
2.4 Blueville
2.4.1 Economic Environment
In this city, individuals have same welfare functions as in Greenville
u(c, e) = c≠ e
2
2 ,
with
c = (1≠ ·)y + · y¯,
where the variables have the same notation as before. There are two di erences
between the two cities. While in Greenville the productivity of e ort, was given by
parental status si and was di erent depending on one’s social origins, in Blueville
everyone has the same productivity s0, i.e. for i = p, r
y = s0e.
For simplicity we will assume that s0 = 12 . The second di erence has to do with the
fact that in Blueville individuals have false beliefs about the productivity of their
e ort which depend on their background in the same way as in Greenville. Thus,
a person from social class i believes that if they exert e ort et they will receive
(pre-tax) income sitet, where
sit =
cit≠1
cit≠1 + c
j
t≠1
.
In this way, in Blueville status si a ects only the incentives of individuals to put more
or less e ort but not their actual productivity. This (behavioural) assumption allows
us to separate the e ects from incentives from the e ects from actual productivity
and it can be interpreted as the e ects of social background to the confidence that
people regarding their actual abilities.
Optimal E ort
Given that the individuals choose their e ort based on their expectation of after
tax income, the maximisation problem of individuals, will lead to the same optimal
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e ort as before:
ep = (1≠ ·)s
and
er = (1≠ ·)(1≠ s),
where s = sp and 1≠ s = sr. In this case, the actual pre tax income will be
yr = (1≠ ·)(1≠ s)2 (2.33)
for the rich; and
yp = (1≠ ·)s2 (2.34)
for the poor. The fact that people do have the same productivity of e ort but
di erent incentives which are related to their background, raises some issues on
whether their di erences should be regarded as circumstances or not. On one hand
individuals do not have di erent skills or resources, while on the other they have
di erent behaviour due to their social origins. Thus there could be arguments both
in favour of Utilitarian policy and in favour of a Rawlsian EOp one. Below we show
that this is not an issue in the current framework.
2.4.2 Single Period Problem
The programme of the EOp Social Planner is the same as in Greenville with the
di erence that income, consumption and indirect utility of individuals are di erent
due to the e ects of the di erence in confidence. Consider a one period problem.
Proposition 12. The EOp equilibrium is the same as the Utilitarian one.
Proof. Average income is
y¯ = 1≠ ·2 [–s+ (1≠ –)(1≠ s)],
or
y¯ = 1≠ ·2 (1 + 2–s≠ –≠ s). (2.35)
Thus consumption is now given by
cp = (1≠ ·)
2s
2 +
·(1≠ ·)
2 (1 + 2–s≠ –≠ s), (2.36)
and
cr = (1≠ ·)
2(1≠ s)
2 +
·(1≠ ·)
2 (1 + 2–s≠ –≠ s). (2.37)
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The indirect utility of the poor (at the optimal e ort level), is
vp(·) = (1≠ ·)
2(s≠ s2)
2 +
·(1≠ ·)
2 (1 + 2–s≠ –≠ s), (2.38)
and for the rich is
vr(·) = (1≠ ·)
2(s≠ s2)
2 +
·(1≠ ·)
2 (1 + 2–s≠ –≠ s). (2.39)
Thus vp = vr. Note that vp = vr is concave with respect to · . At the EOp
programme the Social Planner maximizes vp every period, while in the Utilitarian
case the Social Planner maximizes the sum of the utilities of the whole population.
For the latter case we observe that⁄
i
vidi = –vp + (1≠ –)vr = –vp + (1≠ –)vp = vp. (2.40)
This shows that if individuals exert di erent e ort but do not have di erent edu-
cational resources the tax rate that maximises the welfare of the worst o  actually
maximises the the welfare for the whole of the population. In this case the optimal
tax is
·ú = 12 +
s(1≠ s)
2(1 + 2–s≠ –≠ s2) . (2.41)
Note that the tax rate is always positive.
2.4.3 Myopic Problem
The Myopic EOp programme is defined in the same way as in the previous model.
Proposition 13. At the solution of the MEOp programme the following are true:
(i) There exists a unique stationary solution sú = 12 .
(ii) For s1 ”= sú, at the solution path, st converges to sú.
Proof. We will prove this by showing that for s1 œ [0, 12 ], there exists only one
stationary state solution, sú = 12 , which is globally stable.
1. Substitute the optimal tax rate in cpt and crt . Then
cpt =
1
4(1≠A)
5
(1≠A)s+ (1 +A)st(1≠ st)
A
6
(2.42)
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and
crt =
1
4(1≠A)
5
(1≠A)(1≠ st) + (1 +A)st(1≠ st)
A
6
, (2.43)
where
A = st(1≠ st)1 + 2–st ≠ –≠ s2t
. (2.44)
2. Calculate st+1 = c
p
cp+cr . Note that
1
st+1
= 1 + c
r
t
cpt
= 1 + A(1≠A)s+ (1 +A)st(1≠ st)
A(1≠A)(1≠ st) + (1 +A)st(1≠ st) ,
then
st+1 =
A(1≠A)(1≠ st) + (1 +A)st(1≠ st)
A(1≠A) + 2(1 +A)st(1≠ st) . (2.45)
3. Notice that for s = 12 , st+1 = st and that both st+1 and A are not defined for
st = 0.
4. In order to show that st = 12 is globally stable, it is su cient to show that for
st œ (0, 12), st+1 ≠ st > 0. Note that this is equivalent to
A(1≠A)(1≠ st) + (1≠A)(1≠ st)st > stA(1≠A) + 2(1 +A)s2t (1≠ st)
or
A(1≠A)(1≠ 2st) + (1≠A)(1≠ st)st(1≠ 2st) > 0,
which is true if A < 1. Note that A > 1, if and only if
st(1≠ st) < 1 + 2–st ≠ –≠ s2t ,
or
1≠ –+ st(2–≠ 1)
which is always true.
As we can see from this, contrary to Greenville, in Blueville inequality diminishes
and in the long run disappears. But, as we have shown above, the tax rate is
also the optimal for the sum of the population (Utilitarian). In this way it does not
matter whether date of birth is considered a circumstance or not and thus inequality
diminishes not necessarily because it raises the welfare of the worst o  but because
it raises the welfare of the average individual.
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2.4.4 Forward Looking Problem
Theorem 2. For any s1 œ (0, 12), at the IEOP equilibrium the sequence · is the
same as in the solution of the MEOp programme.
Proof. Suppose that this is not true. Let · , the sequence at the solution of the
MEOp. This then means that there exists a ·ˆ such that for at least one t, say
t = T , there exists ·ˆT , vp(·úT ) < vp(·ˆT ) and for t ”= T vp(·út ) Æ vp(·ˆt). From
Proposition 13, we know that this cannot hold.
The graphs below, present the evolution of inequality for the di erent cases of pop-
ulations of rich and poor.
• – = 0.9
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
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In this model the relative population size matters in a di erent way than in Greenville.
Here, even though in all cases the EOp policy leads to equality in the long run, a
smaller population share of the rich slows down the convergence rate towards equal-
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ity. Our results highlight the fact that EOp ethic can have very di erent implications
regarding inequality, depending on the economic environment which is implemented.
2.5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to provide an answer to whether increasing income
inequality can be considered as fair, according to the most mainstream theory of
distributive justice, namely Equality of Opportunity. Building on the existing litera-
ture on EOp, status and inequality, we analysed the implications of intergenerational
EOp policies, where the extent of inequality between social classes in a given gener-
ation defined the circumstances of the next. In this context the EOp policy should
take into account both inter- and intra-generational inequalities. We have shown
that in an economy where inequality of one generation a ects the marginal returns
of e ort of the next one, the IEOp policy cannot decrease inequality. In this way
our model which shows that it is fair for inequality not to diminish, provides an
example (the first to our knowledge) of Rawlsian “fair” inequality. Contrary to this,
in the case where status only has e ects on individuals’ confidence the IEOp policy
leads to decreasing inequality which disappears in the long run.
We have shown that depending on the context the EOp policies are implemented,
these can lead to extremely di erent outcomes. What seems rather surprising is
the fact that the economy in which inequality diminishes, the EOp programme is
the same as the Utilitarian one. As we have argued in section 2 of this paper, the
Utilitarian distribution can be regarded as an extreme case of the EOp one- where
the society does not recognise any of the individual characteristics as circumstances.
These results highlight the limitations of EOp in terms of being able to reduce
inequality as either it is not able to, or when this is able, it is not needed because
the Utilitarian distribution would give the same results.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneity and Clustering of
Defaults
3.1 Introduction
The hedge fund (HF) industry has experienced an explosive growth in recent years.
The total size of the assets managed by HFs in 2015 was estimated at US$2.74
trillion [BarclayHedge, 2016]. Due to the increasing weight of HFs in the financial
market, failures of HFs can pose a major threat to the stability of the global financial
system. The default of a number of high profile HFs, such as LTCM and HFs owned
by Bear Stearns [Haghani, 2014], testifies to this.
At the same time, poor performance of HFs—the prelude to the failure of a HF—is
empirically found to be strongly correlated across HFs [Boyson et al., 2010], a phe-
nomenon known as “contagion”. Moreover, Boyson et al. [2010] point out that the
correlation between HFs’ worst returns—falling in the bottom 10% of a HF style’s
monthly returns—remains high, even after taking into account that HF returns are
autocorrelated and the e ect of the exposure of HFs to commonly known risk factors.
The findings of Boyson et al. [2010] support the theoretical predictions of Brunner-
meier and Pedersen [2009], who provide a mechanism revealing how liquidity shocks
can lead to downward liquidity spirals and thus to contagion1. The mechanism that
leads to contagion is closely related to the theory of the “leverage cycle”, i.e. the
pro-cyclical increase and decrease of leverage, due to the interplay between equity
volatility and leverage, put forward by Geanakoplos [1996]2.
1Other works which study the the causes of contagion in financial markets include Kyle and
Xiong [2001], and Kodres and Pritsker [2002].
2In fact the theory of leverage cycle, in contrast to other models that endogenise leverage [Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009, Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014, Vayanos and Wang, 2012] has the
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The combination of the dominant role of HFs in the financial system with the pos-
sibility of transmission of the risk, not only to other financial organisations but
also to the real economy, has placed the operation of HFs under close scrutiny and
has highlighted the significance of regulation of the industry. Regulating the HF
industry is not an easy task; Designing the appropriate regulation requires a good
understanding of many aspects such as the mechanism which generates defaults at
the individual level, the mechanism behind contagion, and finally the parameters
which determine the persistency of the e ect of a default of an individual HF on
the industry. Although Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009] provide the mechanism
behind contagion, they overlooked the persistency of the impact of a default of
an individual HF. Our paper aims to fill this gap. In particular, we characterise
the conditions under which the correlation between HF’s defaults is persistent, i.e.
defaults are clustered.
We study an economy with heterogeneous interacting agents (HIA) –HFs in our case
– in the tradition of Day and Huang [1990], Brock and LeBaron [1996], Brock and
Hommes [1997, 1998], Chiarella and He [2002], Thurner et al. [2012] and Poledna
et al. [2014] among others.3 We find that the feedback between market volatility and
margin requirements (downward liquidity spiral), is a necessary yet not a su cient
condition for clustering of defaults to occur, as has been suggested by Boyson et al.
[2010]. In this work we show that heterogeneity plays a pivotal role in the emergence
of clustered defaults: defaults are clustered only if the degree of heterogeneity is
su ciently high.
We develop a simple dynamic model with a representative mean-reverting noise
trader and a finite number of HF managers trading a risky asset. We allow for a
setup where heterogeneity regarding the demand of the risky asset may be due to
di erent preferences towards risk, disagreement on the expected price of the asset,
or disagreement on the volatility of the market. Evidently, market volatility depends
on the HFs’ trading strategy, which in turn, depends on HFs’ demand. In addition,
we allow for the HFs to have access to credit, and we endogenise the probability of
default by assuming that a HF would choose to default when its portfolio value falls
below a threshold.
In this environment we show that when the degree of heterogeneity is su ciently
high, poorly performing HFs are able to absorb shocks caused by fire sales. As a
result, they obtain a larger than usual market share, and improve their performance.
additional merit of making the endogenous determination of collateral possible.
3For a detailed relevant literature review see Hommes [2006], LeBaron [2006] and Chiarella et al.
[2009].
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In this fashion, a default due to exactly their poor performance is delayed, allowing
them to remain in operation until the downturn of the next leverage cycle. This
leads to the increase of the probability of poorly and high-performing hedge funds
to default in sync at a later time, and thus the probability of collective defaults.
Formally, we show that for high degree of heterogeneity the default time-sequence
shows infinite memory. Using the definition of Andersen and Bollerslev [1997] clus-
tering is determined by the divergence of the sum (or integral in continuous time)
of the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the default time sequence, and therefore,
the presence of infinite memory in the underlying stochastic process describing the
occurrence of defaults. Furthermore, we establish a quantitative connection be-
tween the non-trivial aggregate statistics and the presence of infinite memory in the
underlying stochastic process governing the defaults of the HFs. The comparison be-
tween the theoretical prediction of the asymptotic behaviour of the autocorrelation
function (ACF) of defaults and the numerical findings, reveals that our theoretical
predictions are valid even in a market with a finite number of HFs and the clustering
of defaults is confirmed.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relevant
literature. Section 3.3 presents the economic framework that we use. In section 3.4.1
discusses the numerical findings. In Section 3.4.2, we provide analytical results
linking the heavy-tailed aggregate density to the observed statistical character of
defaults on a microscopic level, and the power-law decay of the ACF of the default
time-series of defaults, identifying that defaults are clustered. Finally, section 3.5
provides a short summary with concluding remarks.
3.2 Relevant Literature
Our paper is related methodologically to the HIA literature; and in terms of content,
to the literature which studies the e ects of leverage on financial stability.4 Models
with HIA can give rise to emergent properties of systems that are able to replicate
the empirical trends seen in asset prices, asset returns and their distributions [Lux,
1995, 1998, Lux and Marchesi, 1999, Iori, 2002, He and Li, 2007, Chiarella et al.,
2014]. In Levy [2008], spontaneous crashes are a natural property of a market
with heterogeneous investors who are inclined to conform to their peers, under the
condition that the strength of the conformity e ects is large compared to the degree
4The present paper focuses on the role of leverage on a microeconomic level and does not discuss
the feedback e ects with the Macroeconomy. For the latter see Chiarella and Di Guilmi [2011],
Ryoo [2010] and references therein.
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of heterogeneity of the investors. In other papers, such as Chiarella [1992], Lux
[1995] and Di Guilmi et al. [2014] heterogeneity has to do with the di erent beliefs
and trading rules of the agents (fundamentalists and chartists) which can result to
asset price fluctuations and market instability.
The set up of our model is similar to Thurner et al. [2012] and Poledna et al. [2014]
which study the e ects of leverage in an economy with heterogeneous HFs. Thurner
et al. [2012] show that leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility. Under benign
market conditions HFs become more leveraged as this is then more profitable. High
levels of leverage are correlated with increased asset price fluctuations that become
heavy tailed. The heavy tails are caused by the fact that when a HF reaches its
maximum leverage limit then it has to repay part of its loan by selling some of its
assets. Poledna et al. [2014] use a very similar framework to test three regulatory
policies: (i) imposing limits on the maximum leverage, (ii) similar to the Basle II
regulations, and (iii) a hypothetical perfect hedging scheme in which the banks hedge
against the leverage-induced risk using options. They find that the e ectiveness of
the policies depends on the levels of leverage and that even though the perfect
hedging scheme reduces volatility in comparison to the Basle II scheme, none of
these are able to make the system considerably safer on a systemic level.
Our model extends this framework in two directions. Firstly, in our model the
behaviour of HFs is not given by heuristics but it is derived from first principles.
In both Thurner et al. [2012] and Poledna et al. [2014], HFs are risk neutral and
have di erent demand of the asset given the same information and the same wealth.
The characteristic which makes them heterogeneous, is called “aggression” and aims
to capture the di erent responses of the agents to a mispricing signal. Given the
risk neutrality assumption, it is impossible to provide a rigorous explanation for
the di erence in aggression. Furthermore, deriving the HFs demand functions from
first principles: (i) we bridge the gap between Thurner et al. [2012] and Poledna
et al. [2014]; and the rest of the leverage cycle literature discussed below and (ii) we
provide a framework which allows the study of di erent types of heterogeneity.
The leverage cycle models start with the collateral equilibrium models of Geanako-
plos [1996] and Geanakoplos and Zame [1997] who provide a general equilibrium
model of collateral. The key idea behind these models is that lenders require a col-
lateral from the borrowers in order to lend them funds. This borrowing and lending
is agreed through a contract of a promise of paying back the loan in future states,
where the investor who sells the contract is borrowing money –using a collateral to
back the promise– from the agent who buys the contract. Each contract is chosen
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from a menu of contracts with di erent loan to value (LTV) ratio. In Geanakoplos
[1996] scarcity of collateral leads to only a few contracts being traded, which makes
leverage (LTV) endogenous. Finally, the investors default when the the value of
the collateral is less than the value of the contract that borrowers and lenders have
agreed. Geanakoplos [2003] considers a continuum of risk neutral agents with dif-
ferent priors in a binomial economy with two or three states of the world. He shows
how changes in volatility lead to changes in equilibrium leverage which in turn have
a bigger e ect in asset prices than what agents believe to be the e ect of news.
Geanakoplos [2003, 1996] show that in some cases all agents will choose the same
contract from the contract menu. This result has been recently extended by Fostel
and Geanakoplos [2015] who study in more detail the relationship between leverage
and default and prove that in all binomial economies with financial assets, exactly
one contract is chosen.
Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008] extend the economy of Geanakoplos [2003] to an
economy with multiple assets and two risk averse agents instead of a continuum
of risk neutral ones; and develop an asset pricing theory which links collateral and
liquidity to asset prices. Geanakoplos [2010] combines the insights from Geanakoplos
[1996] where the collateral is based on non financial assets and Geanakoplos [2003]
where the collateral is based on financial assets; and shows that the introduction of
CDS contracts reduces the asset prices. By doing this he puts forward a model of a
double leverage cycle, in housing and securities, which contributes in the explanation
of the 2007-08 crisis. Fostel and Geanakoplos [2012] provide a further analysis of
CDS contracts and show: (i) why trenching and leverage initially raised asset prices
and (ii) why CDSs lowered them later. Simsek [2013a] considers a continuum of
states and two types of agents beliefs, namely optimist and pessimist. He shows
that the type of disagreement between agents has more important e ects on asset
prices than the degree of disagreement between optimists and pessimists.5. To our
knowledge, this is the only paper in this literature which considers the e ect of
di erent degrees of heterogeneity.6
Along similar lines the e ects of leverage have been studied by Gromb and Vayanos
[2002], Acharya and Viswanathan [2011], Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009], Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov [2014] and Adrian and Shin [2010], among others. These
5Other works in the leverage cycle literature include Geanakoplos and Zame [2014], Geanakoplos
[2014] and Fostel and Geanakoplos [2016]. For a recent review of this literature see Fostel and
Geanakoplos [2014].
6In a di erent context Simsek [2013b] shows that the level of belief disagreement a ects the
average consumption risks of individuals in a model which studies the e ect of financial innovation
on portfolio risks.
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approaches di er from the models mentioned in the previous paragraphs in two key
aspects. The models of Acharya and Viswanathan [2011], Adrian and Shin [2010],
Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2014] and Gromb and Vayanos [2002] focus on the ra-
tio of an agent’s total asset value to his total wealth (investor based leverage) while
the leverage cycle models of Geanakoplos and coauthors7 focus on LTV. The second
aspect has to do with the fact that in the models of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
[2009] and Gromb and Vayanos [2002] the leverage ratio is exogenously given where
in the former is given by a VaR rule while in the latter it is given by a maximin rule
used to prevent defaults. In the cases of Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2014], Acharya
and Viswanathan [2011] and Adrian and Shin [2010] leverage is endogenous but is
not determined by collateral capacities. In Acharya and Viswanathan [2011] and
Adrian and Shin [2010] leverage is determined by asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders; while in Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2014] it is determined
by agents’ risk aversion.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Environment
We study an economy with two assets, one riskless (cash C) and one risky, two
types of traders and a bank. The supply of the risky asset, which can be viewed as
a stock, is fixed and equal to N , whereas there is an infinite supply of the riskless
asset. The price of the riskless asset is normalised to 1, whereas the price of the
risky asset at time t pt is determined endogenously. The riskless and the risky asset
are traded by a representative, mean-reverting noise trader and K types of hedge
funds (HFs), whose objective is to exploit potential mispricings of the risky asset.
The role of the bank, which is infinitely liquid, is to provide credit to HFs, by using
the HF’s assets as collateral.
Representative Hedge Fund: Each HF is run by a myopic portfolio manager,
whose objective is to maximise her next period’s CRRA utility function over his
wealth, Wt:
U
1
W jt
2
= W jt
1≠–
/ (1≠ –) , (3.1)
where – > 0 is the measure of relative risk aversion, and j œ {1, . . . ,K}.
The manager’s strategy of the jth HF is a mapping from her information set Sj to
trading orders for the risky and the riskless asset, where Djt (Cjt ) denotes the units
7Also the models of Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009], and Simsek [2013a] use the same ratio.
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of the risky (riskless) asset the jth HF is willing to trade. Thus, beliefs about the
mean logarithmic price of the risky asset E [log(pt+1] and the volatility Var[log pt+1]
plays a crucial role in determining orders.
We assume that only part (1 ≠ “) of the current wealth of the HF is available for
re-investment in the next period. The purpose of this assumption is to exclude
unrealistic cases where the wealth of HFs explodes and default never occurs.8 This
assumption could be interpreted in multiple ways. For instance, it is consistent with
the empirical evidence indicating that the compensation of the fund managers is tied
to the wealth of the HF. This evidence is also in line with the theoretical literature
on optimal contracting in principal-agent environments. Alternatively, the share “
which is not re-invested could be capturing the HF investors’ payment. Taking this
into account the wealth of a HF evolves according to:
W jt+1 = (1≠ “)W jt + (pt+1 ≠ pt)Djt , (3.2)
where the first term of the RHS captures the value of the portfolio held in the
previous period, and the second term captures the change in the value of the risky
assets.
It is worth highlighting that the amount of cash required to complement the trading
order for a risky asset, i.e., Djtpt, may exceed the cash which is available at the
beginning of each trading period. This can be the case because we allow for access
to credit. However, this access to credit is not unbounded, and is assumed to be
subject to regulation. Here the HF cannot become more leveraged than ⁄max, a
maximum ratio of the market value of the risky asset held as collateral by the
bank to the net wealth of the risky asset. Thus, the maximum leverage constraint
translates into:
Djtpt/W
j
t Æ ⁄max.
Consequently, the maximum demand for the risky asset is given by:
Dt,max = ⁄maxW jt /pt, ’j œ {1, . . . ,K}. (3.3)
Furthermore, we allow the HFs to take only long positions, i.e., to be active only
when the asset is underpriced9.
8It is worth highlighting that assuming that the share of wealth which is not re-invested is
fixed and constant over time, allows us to develop a more tractable model. However, the critical
component for our main findings to go through is that not all wealth is re-invested.
9We do this in order to highlight that, even with the HFs taking only long positions, a strategy
inherently less risky than short-selling, the clustering of defaults, and thus systemic risk, is still
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Default: We define as default any event in which the wealth of a HF falls below
Wmin π W0, where W0 denotes the initial endowment of each HF upon entrance
in the market. This enables us to endogenise the probability of default of each
HF. The main objective of this paper is to study both the individual (HF) and
collective (systemic) default probabilities over time. After Tr ≥ U[b, c], time-steps
the bankrupt HF is replaced by a HF with identical characteristics. This allows us
to maintain the character of the market (at a statistical level).
Noise traders: The second type of traders is noise-traders, who are supposed to
trade for liquidity reasons. Following the related literature, we assume that the
demand dnt of the representative noise-trader for the risky asset, in terms of cash
value, is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive [AR(1)] process [Xiong, 2001,
Thurner et al., 2012, Poledna et al., 2014].
log dntt = ﬂ log dntt≠1 + (1≠ ﬂ) log(V N) + ‰t, (3.4)
where ﬂ œ (0, 1) is a parameter controlling the rate of reverting to the mean. Given
that the expected value of ‰t and the auto-covariance function are time-independent,
the stochastic process is wide-sense stationary, ‰t ≥ N
1
0,‡2nt
2
, and V is the fun-
damental value of the risky asset10.
Trading orders and Equilibrium prices: Finally, the price of the risky as-
set is determined endogenously by the market clearing condition [together with
Eqs. (3.2), 3.4), and (3.7)]11.
Dntt+1(pt+1) +
Kÿ
j=1
Djt+1(pt+1) = N, (3.5)
where Dntt+1(pt+1) = dntt+1/pt+1 stands for the demand of the noise traders whereas
Djt+1(pt+1) stands for the demand of the jth HF. Both values are in number of
shares.
Source of Heterogeneity: A critical component, which lies at the heart of our
analysis, is heterogeneity across HFs. We allow for a setup where di erent HFs
respond di erently when facing the same price. In particular, we assume that for a
given price pt, di erent HFs post di erent demand orders of the risky asset, i.e., Dit ”=
present if heterogeneity among the prior beliefs is su ciently large.
10The demand of the noise traders in terms of the number of shares of the risky asset Dnt and
the price of the risky asset pt at period t is dntt = Dntt pt. Hence, In the absence of the HFs, from
Eq. (3.4), and Eq. (3.5) we have E [log pt+1] = log V .
11This system of equations is highly non-linear, and thus, can only be solved numerically.
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Djt for ß ”= j. One can think of many cases which could justify heterogeneity across
HFs. One explanation could be that HFs have di erent beliefs about the fundamental
value V of the asset. Another case which could justify this heterogeneity could be
that HFs agree on the mean, but the disagree on the variance, i.e., Var[log pt+1|F j ].
Finally, HFs’ heterogeneity might be driven by di erent degrees of risk aversion,
i.e., –. The main findings are qualitatively equivalent independently of which of the
previous possible interpretations is implemented. Throughout the paper we assume
that HFs disagree on the market volatility.
The rationale behind the assumption that the managers agree on the fundamental
value of the asset, but disagree on price volatility, relies on the fact that the fun-
damental value, as opposed to price volatility, is not a ected by the behaviour of
HFs. In other words, the fundamental value of the asset is exogenously determined,
whereas the volatility of the market is endogenously determined, with its value
depending on the HFs’ trading strategy, which in turn, depends on their private
information set. Hence, it is not feasible for the managers to reach an agreement
on the market volatility, because they have access to di erent information sets, and
the market volatility is a ected by the information each manager has access to.
Timing: Each period t consists of 4 sub-periods
1. The managers set their demand orders for the risky asset.
2. The price of the risky asset is determined, and the return of each portfolio is
realised.
3. The managers receive their compensation.
4. The next-period’s wealth is determined.
3.3.2 Optimal Demand
The manager of the jth HF maximises his expected utility, given his beliefs F j
about the asset’s fundamental value and the volatility of the market, and subject to
the constraint that the demand cannot exceed Djt,max. This is expressed as
Djt = argmaxDjtœ[0,Dt,max]
Ó
E
Ë
U(W jt+1)|F j
ÈÔ
(3.6)
Solving the optimisation problem we obtain12
Djt = min
;1
a
3
sj log (V/pt) +
1
2
4
,⁄max
<
W jt
pt
, (3.7)
12For details see Appendix A.
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where sj = 1/Var
#
log pt+1|F j
$
. Therefore, the demand of the HFs is proportional
to the expected logarithmic return and their wealth, and inversely proportional to
the conditional variance of the logarithm of the price, given their beliefs.
The clustering of HFs’ defaults is determined by the decay rate of the of the default
time-sequence autocorrelation function (ACF) C(tÕ) , with tÕ being the time-lag
variable. If defaults are clustered, then C(tÕ) decays in such a way that the sum of
the ACF over the lag variable diverges [Baillie, 1996].
Definition 2. Let C(tÕ) denote the autocorrelation of the time series of defaults,
with tÕ being the lag variable. Defaults are clustered if and only if
Œÿ
tÕ=0
C(tÕ)æŒ. (3.8)
Given that the ACF is bounded in [≠1, 1], it follows that the convergence of the
infinite sum is in turn determined by the asymptotic behaviour tÕ ∫ 1 of the ACF.
In this limit, the sum can be approximated by an integral.
In the following we assume that the ACF of the default time sequence can be ap-
proximated by a continuous function for tÕ ∫ 1. Then it follows that,
Remark 1. Defaults are clustered if the ACF asymptotically approaches zero not
faster than C(tÕ) ≥ 1/tÕ. In this case defaults are interrelated (statistically depen-
dent) for all times.
Remark 2. If the decay of the ACF is faster than algebraic, then defaults are not
clustered. The e ect of the shock caused by the default of a HF on the market is
only transient, and the defaults are in the long-run statistically independent.
Our main goal is to study the relationship between the degree of heterogeneity Ÿ,
identified with the di erence between extreme values of sj , and clustering of defaults.
The question arises as to whether the leverage cycle is a su cient condition for the
defaults to be clustered, or rather whether there exists a critical value for the degree
of heterogeneity above which the mechanism of the leverage cycle leads to clustering
of defaults.
In the next section, we present the results of the model. The first subsection presents
the numerical results obtained by iterating the model defined above. We present
the ACFs for various values of Ÿ and interpret these in light of Remarks 1 and 2.
Section 3.4.2 provides an analytical insight into the numerical results.
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3.4 Results
Choice of Parameters
In all simulations we consider a market withK = 10 HFs. In the following we assume
homogeneous preferences towards risk across HFs, and set aj = 3.2 ’j œ {1, . . . , 10},
this being a typical value for HFs [Gregoriou et al., 2007, p. 417]. From Eq. (3.4)
we have ‡˜2nt = ‡
2
nt/(1≠ ﬂ2), where ﬂ is the mean reversion parameter. The inverse
of the expected volatility given the HF’s prior beliefs, i.e. sj = 1/Var
#
log pt+1|F j
$
determines the responsiveness of the HFs to the observed mispricing. In our numer-
ical simulations sj is sampled from a uniform distribution in [1, ”], and ” œ [1.2, 10].
Moreover, the maximum allowed leverage ⁄max is set to 5. This particular value is
representative of the mean leverage across HFs employing di erent strategies [Ang
et al., 2011]. The remaining parameters are chosen as follows: ‡2nt = 0.035, V = 1,
N = 109, W0 = 2 ◊ 106, Wmin = W0/10, ﬂ = 0.99 [Poledna et al., 2014], and
“ = 5 ◊ 10≠4. Bankrupt HFs are reintroduced after Tr periods, randomly chosen
according to a uniform distribution in [10, 200]. Furthermore, the HFs anticipate
that their actions—buying when the risky asset is undervalued—will help moderate
the fluctuations realised in the market. In other words, all HFs correctly believe
that the volatility of the market will be reduced when they enter the market, in
comparison to the volatility observed when only the noise traders are active. How-
ever, they are uncertain about their collective market power, and therefore the
extent to which they will a ect the realised volatility. Thus, all HFs believe that
E [Var (log pt+1)] < ‡2nt/(1≠ ﬂ2).
3.4.1 Numerical results
As aforementioned, the leverage cycle consists in the interplay between the variabil-
ity of prices of the assets put as collateral, and margin requirements. When prices
are high, assets used as collateral are overpriced, and creditors are willing to lend.
In the face of an abrupt fall of the market price of the assets used as collateral, cred-
itors force the lenders to repay part of the loan, such that the margin requirements
are met. Consequently, the lenders are forced to sell in a falling market, accelerating
and reinforcing the fall of the price of the collateral, creating thus a vicious cycle.
In our model, a fall in the price of the risky asset used as collateral is caused by
a sudden drop of the demand of the noise traders dntt . This results into a sudden
increase of the leverage ratio of the jth HF, ⁄jt . In case ⁄jt exceeds the margin
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requirement ⁄jt Æ ⁄jmax HFs are forced to sell, pushing the price even lower. This
is illustrated in Fig. 3.1, where we present: (a) the wealth of three HFs (under,
moderately, and highly responsive to mispricings, j = 2, 6, 10) (b) the corresponding
leverage ratio (c) the demand of the noise traders, and (d) the price of the risky
asset at equilibrium as a function of time, for a low degree of heterogeneity Ÿ = 0.5.
At time t = 738 [marked by a blue triangle in panel (c)] a drop in the demand of
the noise-traders causes an underpricing of the risky asset backing up the loans of
HFs [panel (d)]. In turn, the leverage ratio of all the HFs depicted in Fig 3.1(b)
⁄t=738 increases abruptly [panel (b)], and the margin requirement ⁄max = 5 becomes
binding for the most responsive of the HFs depicted (j = 6, 10). At this point,
the HFs are forced to deleverage pushing the price of the collateral further down,
leading all HFs depicted to default [panel (a)]. The pressure on the price of the risky
asset due to the synchronous deleveraging of the highly responsive HFs can clearly
be recognized if we compare the lowest price reached around the downturn of the
leverage cycle at about t = 738 [marked by a the dashed red line in panel (d)], with
the equilibrium price at t = 7153 [blue filled circle], where the demand of the noise
trader becomes virtually the same to that at t = 738 [marked by a blue triangle],
but the price remains at a considerably higher level. This is because the wealth of
all HFs in this case, is such that the leverage ratio stays well below the maximum
threshold [see panel (b)], and the leverage cycle mechanism remains inactive.
Another observation worth commenting on, is the fact that after the HFs have
been reintroduced in the market, we notice that the least responsive HF (j = 2),
defaults another 2 times, by the end of the time-series depicted in Fig. 3.1, namely
at t = 3976, and t = 9161 [also marked by blue triangles in panel (a)]. not because of
the presence of a shock in the demand of the risky asset, but rather, due to its poor
performance. This is because time is costly in our model (HFs pay managerial fees),
and if the profitability of a HF is low, then it will inevitably be led to bankruptcy,
even in the absence of a shock on the demand of the risky asset. These defaults
happen at random times, i.e. when the observed mispricings happen to be small,
or when the asset is overpriced, for a period of time, and the profits made are also
small, or null, respectively. This also explains the second default of the 6th HF, at
t = 6618 [red triangle in Fig. 3.1(a)], when all the HFs are well below the maximum
leverage constraint.
Let us now study an example with a higher degree of heterogeneity. In Fig. 3.2 we
present the wealthW jt [panel (a)], the leverage ratio ⁄jt [panel (b)] of 3 representative
HFs [j = 2, 6, 10], as well as the logarithmic returns [panel (c)] as a function of time,
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Figure 3.1: (a) The wealth normalised by the endowment W0, (b) the leverage ratio
⁄jt , (c) the demand of the noise traders in terms of money-value, normalised also by
W0, and (d) the equilibrium price of the risky asset, as a function of time, in the
case of Ÿ = 0.5.
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for Ÿ = 3. At t = 493 [marked by a red circle in panels (a), and (c)] the leverage
cycle becomes active, causing an underpricing of the risky asset. However, the least
responsive to mispricings hedge fund (j = 2) of the three depicted, manages to
absorb the shock, as it stays below the maximum leverage ⁄max = 5 [see panel (b),
blue line], and never receives a margin call. However, the bankruptcy of the more
responsive HFs, o ers the HF that has survived the shock (j = 2), the opportunity
to seize a larger market share and, as a result, to perform better in the short-run,
restoring its wealth to a level similar to the one before the shock occurred. In this
way, the most poorly performing HF is given the opportunity to continue operating
until the next downturn of the leverage cycle, at which point it defaults along with
the rest of the HFs at t = 2371 [red disc]. After the second crash of the market we
observe the end of yet another leverage cycle, at which point all the depicted HFs
default again in sync at t = 3044 [black disc]. The narrative is repeated once more
at t = 3684 [blue circle], when again the least responsive HF after absorbing the
shock gets a larger market share, increasing shortly its profitability.
In conclusion, the study of time-series in the case of low (Ÿ = 0.5) and high hetero-
geneity (Ÿ = 3) reveals that increased heterogeneity leads to the increase of collective
defaults. Even more, the synchronous default of highly responsive HFs, gives the
opportunity to the less responsive ones to increase their market share, and thus,
their profitability, even for a short-period of time. Still, this increases the chance of
the poor-performing HFs to survive until the next downturn of the leverage cycle,
suppressing defaults occurring at random times due to their poor performance, and
thus increasing even more the probability of synchronous defaults. Therefore, this
analysis hints that the degree of heterogeneity is intimately connected to the level
of systemic risk in the market.
To assess quantitatively the e ect of the degree of heterogeneity, explained above,
on the systemic risk, we study the persistence of the correlation between defaults
[see definition 2]. In Figure 3.3(a) we compare the numerically computed ACF
of the default time-sequence13 as observed on the aggregate level for 11 di erent
degrees of heterogeneity Ÿ, determined by the support of the distribution of sj .
The results were obtained by iterating the model described in Section 3.3 for up to
3◊ 108 periods, and averaging over 40 realisations of the responsiveness sj ; namely,
sj ≥ U[1, ”], with ” = {1.2, 1.4, 1.7, 2, 3, 5, 6, . . . , 10}. Clearly, when the degree of
heterogeneity Ÿ = ” ≠ 1 Æ 1, the ACF decays far more rapidly in comparison with
larger values of heterogeneity. In fact, as it can be observed in the figure, the ACF
13The time-sequence considered is constructed by mapping defaults to 1s, irrespective of which
HF defaulted, and to 0 otherwise.
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Figure 3.2: (a) The wealth normalised by the endowment W0, (b) the leverage ratio
⁄jt , and (d) the logarithmic returns on the risky asset, as a function of time, with
Ÿ = 3.
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for Ÿ Æ 1 decays faster than a power-law with exponent equal to ≠1 (black dashed
line), which is the largest exponent (in absolute terms) leading to a non-integrable
ACF [see Remark 1]. On the other hand, the converse is true for large degrees of
heterogeneity (Ÿ > 2), in which case the ACF decays asymptotically—tÕ ∫ 1—as a
power-law with exponent less than 1 in absolute value. Consequently,
Result 1. For Ÿ Æ 1, the mechanism of the leverage cycle, does not result into
su ciently high long-range correlations for defaults to be clustered.
Figure 3.3(a) also shows that for increasing heterogeneity the ACF converges to a
limiting form as the heterogeneity is increased, which is reflected in the coalescence
of the ACFs corresponding to Ÿ Ø 5. The latter is more clearly demonstrated in
Fig 3.3(b), where a blow-up of the area within the rectangle shown in panel (a) is
presented. Therefore,
Result 2. For su ciently large values of the degree of heterogeneity Ÿ, namely for
Ÿ Ø 5, the ACF converges to a limiting form exhibiting a power-law trend with an
exponent less than 1 (in absolute value).
To gain some insight into the qualitative di erence with respect to the persistence
of correlations between defaults as a function of the degree of heterogeneity Ÿ, let
us turn our attention to the default statistics. In Fig. 3.5 we present the aggre-
gate PDF of waiting times between defaults14 using a logarithmic scale on both
axes for 6 di erent values of Ÿ. We observe that for small degrees of heterogeneity
Ÿ = {0.2, 0.4, 0.7} the density function asymptotically decays approximately expo-
nentially. This is better demonstrated in the inset were we use semi-logarithmic
axes15. On the contrary, for su ciently large heterogeneity—such that the corre-
sponding ACFs have converged to the limiting form—the PDFs exhibit a constant
decay rate in the doubly logarithmic plot (power-law tail). Fitting the aggregate
density for Ÿ = 916, corresponding to the highest degree of heterogeneity considered,
with the model P˜ (·) ≥ ·≠’ we obtain ’ = 2.84± 0.03 (red dashed line).
Let us now turn our attention to the statistical properties of HFs on a microscopic
scale, i.e. study each HF default statistics individually. In Fig. 3.6 we show as
an example the density function Pj(·), of waiting times · between defaults, for a
number of HFs corresponding to high heterogeneity, Ÿ = 9, with sj = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
14The PDF of waiting-times between default is also known as the failure function in survival
analysis theory.
15The use of a logarithmic scale for the vertical axis transforms an exponential function to a
linear one.
16To increase the accuracy of the fit, we increase the number of realisations of sj to 103.
67
100 101 102 103
t′
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
C
(t
′
)
κ = 0.2
       0.4
       0.7
       1
       2
       4
       5
       6
       7
       8
       9
102 103
10-3
10-2
100 101 102 103
t′
10-4
10-2
C
(t
′
)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.3: (a) The ACF of the binary sequence of defaults corresponding to 11 dif-
ferent values of Ÿ. The dashed black line corresponds to a power-law with exponent
-1, which is the largest exponent that leads to clustering [see Remark 1].
Figure 3.4: (b) A blow-up of the rectangular area shown in panel (a) illustrating the
coalescence of C(tÕ) for large values of the degree of heterogeneity, Ÿ = {6, 7, 8, 9}.
(c) The ACF corresponding to Ÿ = 9, averaged over 5◊ 102 di erent realisations of
sj (red upright triangles). The blue dot-dashed line is the result of fitting C(tÕ) with
a power-law model C(tÕ) Ã tÕ≠÷, ÷ = 0.887 ± 0.003 (R2 = 0.9927). The power-law
with exponent ≠1 is also shown for the sake of comparison (black dashed line).
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Figure 3.5: The aggregate PDF of waiting times between defaults for 6 di erent
degrees of heterogeneity using double logarithmic scale. For large heterogeneity Ÿ =
{7, 8, 9}, we observe that the PDF is decaying approximately linearly, corresponding
to a power-law decay. Performing a fit with the model P˜ (·) ≥ ·≠’ we obtain
’ = 2.84±0.03 (R2 = 0.9947). To illustrate the approximate exponential asymptotic
decay of the aggregate PDF for Ÿ = {0.2, 0.4, 0.7} we also show the corresponding
aggregate densities using a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis (inset).
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on a log-linear scale. The results were obtained by iterating the model for 3 ◊ 108
periods and averaging over 100 di erent initial conditions17, holding sj fixed at
{1, 2, . . . 10}. We observe that Pj(·) for · ∫ 1 decays linearly, and thus it can be
well described by an exponential function.
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Figure 3.6: The PDF of waiting times between defaults · for specific HFs, hav-
ing di erent responsiveness sj = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10} (black diagonal crosses, downright
triangles, red upright crosses, magenta diamonds and cyan upright triangles, respec-
tively). Note the log-linear scale.
Consequently, all HFs on a microscopic level—individually—are characterised by
exponential PDFs of waiting-times, and therefore the default events approximately
follow a Poisson process. The stability of each HF, quantified by the probability of
default per time-step µj , is di erent for each HF, and depends on its responsiveness
sj . This is reflected by the di erent slopes of the approximately straight lines shown
in Fig 3.6 for the di erent values of sj .
Thus, the default statistics on an aggregate level are qualitatively di erent for large
values of Ÿ compared to the corresponding ones observed when each HF is studied
17We are averaging using di erent seeds for the pseudo-random number generator used in
Eq. (3.4).
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individually. Moreover we have already established that for such high values of
the degree of heterogeneity the defaults are clustered. In the following we will
investigate how the emergence of a fat-tail in the aggregate statistics is connected
with the observed clustering of defaults.
3.4.2 Analytical Results
From the numerical results, we observe that Pj(·), for · ∫ 1 decays linearly (in log-
linear scale) and thus it can be well described by an exponential function. Therefore
we can assume that:
Pj(· ; · ∫ 1) ≥ µj exp(≠µj·), ’j œ {1, . . . , 10} (3.9)
When the above is true, we know that for su ciently long waiting times between
defaults; default events of individual HFs have the following statistical properties:
(i) they are approximately independent and (ii) occur with a well defined mean
probability per unit time step. From this we get that the probability Pj(T = ·),
· œ N+, is given by a geometric probability mass function (PMF)
Pj(·) = pj(1≠ pj)·≠1, (3.10)
where pj denotes the probability of default of the jth HF.
Given that our focus is in the asymptotic properties of the PDFs, T can be treated
as a continuous variable. In this limit, the renewal process given by equation (3.10),
becomes a Poisson process; and the geometric PMF tends to an exponential PDF18.
Thus equation (3.9) can be approximated by (3.10).
Consequently, our intuition with respect to the statistical properties of default events
when each HF is considered individually is aligned with our numerical findings
presented in the previous Section [see Fig 3.6].
The question then arises as to how the aggregation of these very simple stochastic
processes can lead to the non-trivial fat-tailed statistics we observed in Fig 3.5 for
a su ciently high degree of heterogeneity. Evidently, the aggregate PDF P˜ (·) we
seek to obtain is a result of the mixing of the Poisson processes governing each of
the HFs. In the limit of a continuum of HFs the aggregate distribution is
P˜ (·) =
⁄ Œ
0
µ exp(≠µ·)ﬂ(µ)dµ, (3.11)
18This limit is valid for · ∫ 1 and pj π 1 such that ·pj = µj , where µj is the parameter of the
exponential PDF [see equation (3.9)] [Nelson, 1995].
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where ﬂ(µ) stands for the PDF of µ given the responsiveness sj19.
Assumption 1. ﬂ(µ) in a neighbourhood of 0 can be expanded in a power series of
the form ﬂ(µ) = µ‹
nq
k=0
ckµk +Rn+1(µ), with ‹ > ≠1 20.
This assumption is quite general, and only excludes functions that behave patholog-
ically in a neighbourhood around 0. Then from equation (3.9) and Assumption 1 we
can show that the aggregation of the exponential densities determining the default
statistic for each HF individually leads to a qualitatively di erent heavy-tailed PDF.
Let µj œ R+ be the mean default rate of the jth HF, contributing at the aggregate
level with a statistical weight ﬂ(µ), which is determined by the interactions between
the agents in the market and the distribution of the responsiveness s.
Proposition 14. Consider the exponential density function P (· ;µ) describing the
individual default statistics of a HF. It follows then from Assumption 1, that the
aggregate PDF P˜ (·) exhibits a power-law tail.
Proof. The aggregate density can be viewed as the Laplace transform L [.] of the
function „(µ) © µﬂ(µ), with respect to µ. Hence,
P˜ (T = ·) © L [„(µ)] (·) =
⁄ Œ
0
„(µ) exp(≠µ·)dµ. (3.12)
To complete the proof we apply Watson’s Lemma [Debnath and Bhatta, 2007, p.
171] to the function „(µ), according to which the asymptotic expansion of the
Laplace transform of a function f(µ) that admits a power-series expansion in a
neighbourhood of 0 [see Assumption 1] of the form f(µ) = µ‹
nq
k=0
bkµk + Rn+1(µ),
with ‹ > ≠1 is
Lµ [f(µ)] (·) ≥
nÿ
k=0
bk
 (‹ + k + 1)
·‹+k+1
+O
3 1
·‹+n+2
4
. (3.13)
Given that „(µ) for µæ 0+ is
„(µ) = µ‹+1
nÿ
k=0
ckµ
k +Rn+1(µ), (3.14)
we conclude that
P˜ (·) Ã 1
·k+‹+2
+O
3 1
·k+‹+3
4
. (3.15)
19The distribution function of the random parameter µ is also known as the structure or mixing
distribution [Beichelt, 2010].
20Since ﬂ(µ) is a PDF it must be normalisable and thus, a singularity at µ = 0 must be integrable.
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Corollary 3. If 0 < k + ‹ Æ 1, then the variance of the aggregate density diverges
(shows a fat tail). However, the expected value of · remains finite.
An important aspect of the emergent heavy-tailed statistics stemming from the
heterogeneous behaviour of the HFs, is the absence of a characteristic time-scale
for the occurrence of defaults (scale-free asymptotic behaviour21). Thus, even if
each HF defaults according to a Poisson process with intensity µ(s)—which has the
intrinsic characteristic time-scale 1/µ(s)—after aggregation this property is lost due
to the mixing of all the individual time-scales. Therefore, on a macroscopic level,
there is no characteristic time-scale, and all time-scales, short and long, become
relevant.
This characteristic becomes even more prominent if the density function ﬂ(µ) is
such that the resulting aggregate density becomes fat-tailed, i.e. the variance of the
aggregate distribution diverges. In this case extreme values of waiting times be-
tween defaults will be occasionally observed, deviating far from the mean. This will
leave a particular “geometrical” imprint on the sequence of default times. Defaults
occurring close together in time (short waiting times ·) will be clearly separated
due to the non-negligible probability assigned to long waiting times. Consequently,
defaults, macroscopically, will have a “bursty” or intermittent, character, with long
quiescent periods of time without the occurrence of defaults and “violent” periods
during which many defaults are observed close together in time. Hence, infinite
variance of the aggregate density will result in the clustering of defaults.
In order to show this analytically, we construct a binary sequence by mapping time-
steps when no default events occur to 0 and 1 otherwise. As we show below, if the
variance of the aggregate distribution is infinite, then the autocorrelation function
of the binary sequence generated in this manner, exhibits a power-law asymptotic
behaviour with an exponent — < 1. Therefore, the ACF is non-summable and
consequently, according to Definition 2 defaults are clustered.
Let Ti, i œ N+, be a sequence of times when one or more HFs default and assume
that the PDF of waiting times between defaults P˜ (·), for · æ Œ, behaves (to
leading order) as P˜ (·) Ã ·≠a. Consider now the renewal process Sm =
mq
i=0
Ti. Let
21If a function f(x) is a power-law, i.e. f(x) = cxa, then a rescaling of the independent variable
of the form x æ bx leaves the functional form invariant (f(x) remains a power-law). In fact, a
power-law functional form is a necessary and su cient condition for scale invariance [Farmer and
Geanakoplos, 2008]. This scale-free behaviour of power-laws is intimately linked with concepts such
as self-similarity and fractals [Mandelbrot, 1983].
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Y (t) = 1[0,t] (Sm), where 1A : Ræ {0, 1} denotes the indicator function, satisfying
1A =
I
1 : x œ A
0 : x /œ A
J
.
Theorem 3. If the variance of the density function P˜ (·) diverges, i.e. 2 < a Æ 3,
then the ACF of Y (t),
C(tÕ) = E [Yt0Yt0+tÕ ]≠ E [Yt0 ] E [Yt0+tÕ ]
‡2Y
,
where t0, tÕ œ R and ‡2Y is the variance of Y (t), for tæŒ decays as
C(tÕ) Ã tÕ2≠– (3.16)
Proof. Assuming that the process defined by Y (t) is ergodic we can express the
autocorrelation as,
C(tÕ) Ã lim
KæŒ
1
K
Kÿ
t=0
YtYt+tÕ . (3.17)
Obviously, in equation (3.17) for YtYt+tÕ to be non-zero, a default must have occurred
at both time t and tÕ22. The PDF P˜ (·) can be viewed as the conditional probability
of observing a default at period t given that a default has occurred t ≠ · periods
earlier. If we further define C(0) = 1 and P˜ (0) = 0, the correlation function can
then be expressed in terms of the aggregate density as follows:
C(tÕ) =
tÕÿ
·=0
C(tÕ ≠ ·)P˜ (·) + ”tÕ,0, (3.18)
where ”tÕ,0 is the Kronecker delta. Since we are interested in the long time limit
of the ACF we can treat time as a continuous variable and solve equation (3.18)
by applying the Laplace transform L{f(·)}(s) = sŒ0 f(·) exp(≠s·)d· , utilising also
the convolution theorem. Taking these steps we obtain
C(s) = 1
1≠ P˜ (s) , (3.19)
where P˜ (s) =
sŒ
1 P˜ (·) exp(≠s·)d· , since P˜ (0) = 0. After the substitution of the
Laplace transform of the aggregate density in equation (3.19), one can easily derive
the correlation function in the Fourier space F{C(tÕ)} by the use of the identity
22A detailed exposition of the proof is given in Appendix 3.7.
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[Je rey and Zwillinger, 2007, p. 1129],
F{C(tÕ)} Ã C(sæ 2ﬁif) + C(sæ ≠2ﬁif). (3.20)
to obtain ,
F{C(tÕ)} fπ1Ã
Y__]__[
fa≠3, 2 < a < 3
| log(f)|, a = 3
const., a > 3
. (3.21)
Therefore, for a > 3 this power spectral density function is a constant and Yt behaves
as white noise. Consequently, if the variance of P˜ (·) is finite, then Yt is uncorrelated
for large values of tÕ.
Finally, inverting the Fourier transform when 2 < a Æ 3 we find that the autocorre-
lation function asymptotically (tÕ ∫ 1) behaves as
C(tÕ) Ã tÕ2≠a, 2 < a Æ 3. (3.22)
Turning back to the numerical results shown in Fig. 3.5, the aggregate PDF as
already discussed converges to a limiting form, characterised by a fat-tail with an
exponent equal ≠2.84 ± 0.03. Therefore, from equation (3.22) we deduce that the
ACF should show a power-law trend with exponent ≠0.84 ± 0.03. The result of
the regression of the ACF for Ÿ = 9 was ≠0.887± 0.003 [blue dashed-dotted line in
Fig. 3.3(c)], in good agreement with the analytical result.
In this Section we have shown that when the default statistics of HFs are individu-
ally described by (di erent) Poisson processes (due to the heterogeneity in the prior
beliefs among the HFs) we obtain a qualitatively di erent result after aggregation:
the aggregate PDF of the waiting-times between defaults exhibits a power-law tail
for long waiting-times. As shown in Proposition 14, if the relative proportion of
very stable HFs approaches 0 su ciently slowly (at most linearly with respect to
the individual default rate µ, as µ æ 0), then long waiting-times between defaults
become probable, and as a result, defaults which occur closely in time will be sep-
arated by long quiescent time periods and defaults will form clusters. The latter
is quantified by the non-integrability of the ACF of the sequence of default times,
signifying infinite memory of the underlying stochastic process describing defaults
on the aggregate level. It is worth commenting on the fact that the most stable
(in terms of defaults) HFs are responsible for the appearance of a fat-tail in the
aggregate PDF.
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3.5 Conclusions
This paper studied the role of the heterogeneity in available information among
di erent HFs in the emergence of clustering of defaults. The economic mechanism
leading to the clustering of defaults is related to the leverage cycle put forward by
Geanakoplos and coauthors. In these models the presence of leverage in a market
leads to the overpricing of the collateral used to back-up loans during a boom,
whereas, during a recession, collateral becomes depreciated due to a synchronous de-
leveraging compelled by the creditors. In the present work we have shown that this
feedback e ect between market volatility and margin requirements is a necessary,
yet not a su cient condition for the clustering of defaults and, in this sense, the
emergence of systemic risk.
We have shown that a large di erence in the expectations of the HFs is an essential
ingredient for defaults to be clustered. We show that when the degree of hetero-
geneity, realised in our model beliefs across HFs about the volatility of the market,
is su ciently high, poorly performing HFs are able to absorb shocks caused by fire
sales. As a result, they obtain a larger than usual market share, and improve their
performance. In this fashion, a default due to their poor performance is delayed,
allowing them to remain in operation until the downturn of the next leverage cy-
cle. This leads to the increase of the probability of poorly and high-performing
hedge funds to default in sync at a later time, and thus the probability of collective
defaults.
This manifests itself in the emergence of scale-free (heavy tailed) statistics on the
aggregate level. We show, that this scale-free character of the aggregate survival
statistics, when combined with large fluctuations of the observed waiting-times be-
tween defaults, i.e. infinite variance of the corresponding aggregate PDF, leads to
the presence of infinite memory in the default time sequence. Consequently, the
probability of observing a default of a HF in the future is much higher if one (or
more) is observed in the recent past, and as such, defaults are clustered. Therefore,
our work shows that individual stability can lead to market-wide risk.
Interestingly, a slow-decaying PDF of waiting-times, which inherently signifies a non-
negligible measure of extremely stable HFs, is shown to be directly connected with
the presence of infinite memory. The leverage cycle theory correctly emphasises the
importance of collateral, in contrast to the conventional view, according to which the
interest rate completely determines the demand and supply of credit. However, the
feedback loop created by the volatility of asset prices and margin constraints poses a
systemic risk only if the market is su ciently heterogeneous such that “pessimistic”
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players, who individually are very stable, exceed a critical mass.
This work raises several interesting questions, which we aim to address in the future.
In this paper we have assumed that the di erence in beliefs is due to disagreement
about the long-run volatility of the risky asset, and remains constant over time, i.e.
the agents do not update their beliefs given their observations. This assumption is
crucial in order to be able to analyse the e ects of di erent degrees of heterogeneity.
Regarding this issue, future work can take two di erent directions: On the one hand,
this assumption can be relaxed, allowing agents to update their beliefs on market
volatility. However, given that market volatility is endogenous, it is not guaranteed
that agents’ beliefs will convergence. On the other hand, we can study the e ects
of heterogeneity stemming from di erent aversion to risk among the HFs, while
retaining the common prior assumption. Furthermore, these two approaches can be
combined by assuming both di erent aversion to risk, and di erent beliefs about
price volatility. Finally, our work can also be extended in two further directions.
The first being to give a more active role to the bank which provides loans, while
the second is to study the e ects of di erent regulations on credit supply.
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3.6 Appendix A
We seek to determine the optimal demand for each of the HFs given their beliefs
about price volatility F j . This translates into the optimisation problem, assuming
log-normal returns on the risky asset
argmaxDjtœ[0,Dt,max]
Ó
E
Ë
U(W jt+1)|qj
ÈÔ
, (A.1)
where U
1
W jt+1
2
= W jt+1
1≠a
/(1≠ a) ≥ W jt+1
1≠a, and W jt+1 is the wealth of the jth
HF at the next period. To simplify the notation, in the following we will assume that
the expected value, and variance are always conditioned on HF’s prior beliefs, and
moreover, we will drop the superscript j. Eq. (A.1) is equivalent to the maximisation
of the logarithm of the expected utility. Furthermore, given that returns are log-
normally distributed, it follows that [Campbell and Viceira, 2002, pp. 17-21]
log E
Ë
Wt+1
1≠aÈ = E ËlogWt+11≠aÈ+ Var
Ë
logWt+11≠a
È
2 (A.2)
Consequently, the problem becomes
argmaxDtœ[0,Dt,max]
;
(1≠ a) E [logWt+1] + (1≠ a)2Var [logWt+1]2
<
. (A.3)
The wealth of the jth HF at the next period is
Wt+1 = (1≠ “)(1 + xtRt+1)Wt, (A.4)
where x is the fraction of its wealth invested into the risky asset, and R the (arith-
metic) return of the portfolio. Re-expressing Eq. (A.4) in terms of the logarithmic
returns r we get
log (Wt+1) = logWt + log [1 + xt (exp(rt+1)≠ 1)] + log(1≠ “), (A.5)
albeit a transcendental equation with respect to r. An approximative solution can
be obtained by performing a Taylor expansion of Eq (A.5) with respect to r to
obtain
log(Wt+1) = log(Wt) + xtrt+1
3
1 + rt+12
4
≠ xt
2
2 r
2
t+1 + log(1≠ “) +O
1
r3
2
. (A.6)
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Substituting Eq. (A.6) into Eq. (A.3), and furthermore approximating E(r2t+1) with
Var(rt+1) we obtain
argmaxDtœ[0,⁄max]
;
logWt + xtE(rt+1) + xt2 (1≠ xt)Var(rt+1) + log(1≠ “)
<
.
(A.7)
Finally the first-order condition yields
xt = min
CE(rt+1) + 12aVar(rt+1)
aVar (rt+1)
,⁄max
D
. (A.8)
Consequently, the optimal demand for HF j in terms of the number of shares of the
risky asset given the price at the current period is
Dt = min
I
log(V/pt) + 12aVar
#
log pt+1|F j
$
aVar [log pt+1|F j ] ,⁄max
J
Wt
pt
. (A.9)
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3.7 Appendix B
As already stated in Section 3.4.2, Theorem 3, assuming that the process defined
by Y (t) = 1[0,t] (Sm) is ergodic, the auto-correlation function can be expressed as a
time-average
C(tÕ) Ã lim
KæŒ
1
K
Kÿ
t=0
YtYt+tÕ . (B.1)
Given that Y (t) is by definition a binary variable, the only non-zero terms contribut-
ing to the sum appearing on the right hand side (RHS) of equation (B.1) correspond
to default events (mapped to 1) that occur with a time di erence equal to tÕ. There-
fore, the RHS of equation (B.1) is proportional to the conditional probability of
observing a default at time tÕ, given that a default has occurred at time t = 0.
Therefore, we can express C(tÕ) in terms of the aggregate probability P˜ (· = tÕ), i.e.
the probability of a default event being observed after tÕ time-steps, given that one
has just been observed. Moreover, we must take into account all possible combi-
nations of defaults happening at times t < tÕ. For example, let us assume that we
want to calculate C(tÕ = 2). In this case there are exactly 2 possible set of events
that would give a non-zero contribution. Either a default happening exactly 2 time-
steps after the last one (at t = 0), or two subsequent defaults happening at t = 1,
and t = 2. In this fashion, we can express the correlation function in terms of the
probability the waiting-times between defaults as [Procaccia and Schuster, 1983],
C(1) = P˜ (1), (B.2)
C(2) = P˜ (2) + P˜ (1)P˜ (1)
= P˜ (2) + P˜ (1)C(1), (B.3)
...
C(tÕ) = P˜ (tÕ) + P˜ (tÕ ≠ 1)C(1) + . . . P˜ (1)C(tÕ ≠ 1). (B.4)
If we further define C(0) = 1 and P˜ (0) = 0, then equation (B.4) can be written
more compactly as
C(tÕ) =
tÕÿ
·=0
C(tÕ ≠ ·)P˜ (·) + ”tÕ,0, (B.5)
where ”tÕ,0 is the Kronecker delta.
We are interested only in the long time limit of the ACF. Hence, we can treat time
as a continuous variable and solve equation (B.5) by applying the Laplace transform
L{f(·)}(s) = sŒ0 f(·) exp(≠s·)d· , utilising also the convolution theorem .Taking
80
these steps we obtain
C(s) = 1
1≠ P˜ (s) , (B.6)
where P˜ (s) = L
Ó
P˜ (·)
Ô
(s) =
sŒ
0 P˜ (·) exp(≠s·)d· . We will assume that P˜ (·) Ã
·≠a for any · œ [1,Œ), i.e. the asymptotic power-law behaviour (· ∫ 1) will be
assumed to remain accurate for all values of · . Under this assumption,
P˜ (·) =
I
A·≠a, · œ [1,Œ),
0, · œ [0, 1). , (B.7)
where A = 1/
sŒ
1 ·
≠ad· = a≠ 1. The Laplace transform of equation (B.7) is,
P˜ (s) = (a≠ 1)Ea(s), (B.8)
where Ea(s) denotes the exponential integral function defined as,
Ea(s) =
⁄ Œ
1
exp (≠st) t≠adt /; Re(s) > 0. (B.9)
The inversion of the Laplace transform after the substitution of equation (B.8) in
equation (B.6) is not possible analytically. However, we can easily derive the corre-
lation function in the Fourier space (known as the power spectral density function)
F{C(tÕ)}(f) =
Ò
2
ﬁ
sŒ
0 C(tÕ) cos(2ﬁf)dtÕ by the use of the identity [Je rey and Zwill-
inger, 2007, p. 1129],
F{C(tÕ)} = 1Ô
2ﬁ
[C(sæ 2ﬁif) + C(sæ ≠2ﬁif)] . (B.10)
relating the Fourier cosine transform F {g(t)} (f), of a function g(t), to its Laplace
transform g(s), to obtain,
C(f) = 1Ô
2ﬁ
3 1
1≠ (a≠ 1)Ea(2ifﬁ) +
1
1≠ (a≠ 1)Ea(≠2ifﬁ)
4
(B.11)
From equation (B.11) we can readily see that as f æ 0+ (equivalently tÕ æ Œ),
C(f)æŒ. To derive the asymptotic behaviour of C(f) we expand about f æ 0+
(up to linear order) using
Ea(2ifﬁ) = aia+1(2ﬁ)a≠1fa≠1 (≠a)≠ 2iﬁf
a≠ 2 +
1
a≠ 1 +O(f
2) (B.12)
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to obtain
C(f) = ≠ i
Ô
2ﬁ(a≠ 2)f
4ﬁ2(a≠ 1)f2 + (2a+1ﬁa(if)a ≠ a(2iﬁ)afa) (2≠ a)
+ i
Ô
2ﬁ(a≠ 2)f
4ﬁ2(a≠ 1)f2 + (2a+1ﬁa(≠if)a ≠ a(≠2iﬁ)afa) (2≠ a) .
(B.13)
After some algebraic manipulation, for f æ 0 equation (B.13) yields
C(f) = Afa≠3, (B.14)
where
A = ≠2
a+ 12 (a≠ 2)2ﬁa≠ 32 sin !ﬁa2 " (1≠ a)
(a≠ 1) . (B.15)
Therefore, for 2 < a < 3 we see that the Fourier transform of the correlation function
behaves as,
C(f) Ã fa≠3. (B.16)
If a = 3, then the instances of the Gamma function appearing on the RHS of
equation (B.13) diverge. Therefore, for a = 3 we need to use a di erent series
expansion around f æ 0+. Namely,
E3(2ﬁif) =
1
2 ≠ 2iﬁf + ﬁ
2f2(2 log(2iﬁf) + 2“ ≠ 3) +O
1
f5
2
, (B.17)
where “ stands for the Euler’s constant. The substitution of equation (B.17) into
equation (B.11) leads to
C(f) =≠ Re
;#
2 log(ﬁf)≠ 2“ + 3≠ log(4)$/#Ô2ﬁ(2iﬁf log(ﬁf)
+ ﬁf(2i“ + ﬁ + i(log(4)≠ 3))≠ 2)
◊ (ﬁ(3i≠ 2i“ + ﬁ)f ≠ 2iﬁf log(2ﬁf)≠ 2)$<,
(B.18)
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and thus,
C(f) =
3
≠ 8“3ﬁ2f2 ≠ 2ﬁ2f(f(≠6 log(ﬁ)(log
1
16ﬁ3
2
≠ 2“ log
1
4ﬁf2
2
) +
1
12“2 + ﬁ2
2
log(ﬁf) + 9(3≠ 4“) log(2ﬁf))
+ 4f log3(f) + 6f(2“ ≠ 3 + log(4) + 2 log(ﬁ)) log2(f)
+ 6f
1
“ log(16) + (log(2ﬁ)≠ 3) log
1
4ﬁ2
22
log(f) + 4f log(2ﬁ)((log(2)≠ 3) log(2)
+ log(ﬁ) log(4ﬁ))≠ 4 log(2ﬁf))≠ 4“2ﬁ2f2(log(64)≠ 9)≠ 2“(ﬁ2f(f
1
ﬁ2 + 27 + 12 log2(2)
2
≠ 4) + 4) + ﬁ2f
1
f
1
27≠ ﬁ2(log(4)≠ 3) + log(8) log(16)
2
≠ 12
2
≠ 8 log(2ﬁf) + 12
4
?3Ô
2ﬁ(4ﬁ2f2 log(ﬁf)(log(4ﬁf) + 2“ ≠ 3) + ﬁ2f(f(4“2 + ﬁ2 + (log(4)≠ 3)2
+ 4“(log(4)≠ 3))≠ 4) + 4)2
4
.
(B.19)
As f æ 0 we have,
C(f) ≥ |log(f)| (B.20)
Finally, if a > 3, then equation (B.11) for f æ 0 tends to a constant, and thus, Yt
behaves as white noise. Consequently, if the variance of P˜ (·) is finite, then Yt is for
large values of tÕ is uncorrelated.
To summarise, the spectral density function for f π 1 is,
C(f) fπ1Ã
Y__]__[
fa≠3, 2 < a < 3
| log(f)|, a = 3
const., a > 3
. (B.21)
The inversion of the Fourier (cosine) transform in equation (B.21) yields,
C(tÕ) Ã tÕ2≠a/; 2 < a Æ 3 · tÕ ∫ 1. (B.22)
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